An Approach to Mitigate Denial Of Service Attack using Probabilistic Packet Marking

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ABSTRACT

In todays' Digitized Networks, Internet is the fundamental wellspring of correspondence. Web extended quickly from most recent one decade and for each correspondence it has turned into a noteworthy spine. To give availability to every single gadget we require a colossal measure of addresses. To performing comparative or distinctive assignments, Network Comprises majority of hubs which are cooperating. The system has a colossal space for assaults to make the system wasteful. Among them, the real assault that is bringing on tremendous turbulences to the system and its equal assets are Denial of Service (DoS)attack. We can not totally maintain a strategic distance from DDoS attack but rather we can lessen the DDoS attack. DoS attacks can be counteracted if the parodied source IP location is followed back to its starting point, which permits relegating punishments to the culpable party or disconnections the traded off hosts and areas from whatever is left of the system in numerous cases. The major issue stressed with revelation structures is IP spoofing. The issue of identifying the sources of a DoS attack is among the hardest in the Internet Security region, particularly since attackers frequently utilize erroneous source IP address. In earlier there are numerous methods that can sense and maintain a strategic distance from DoS attacks, Packet Marking strategies are the most generally utilized effective systems towards tracebacking the starting point of assaults. This paper proposes a marking arrangement which registers the information with IP header field of the packet to beat the issue of IP spoofing. The marked information is used to remake the IP location of the entrance router *joined with the attack source at the recognizing end. This paper talks about different known PM strategies accessible for battling back against the specified assaults. we have overviewed traceback instruments in light of PPM which permits the casualty to traceback the suitable starting point of satirize IP source address. We propose traceback mechanism that reduce overhead and give high security utilizing key exchange algorithm.*

Keyword : - *Denial Of Service attack, IP Traceback, Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM), Message Authentication Code (MAC)*

1. INTRODUCTION

Network security ordinarily begins with the terms like username, password, routing data, packet data, routing algorithms, system executives, packet tracing, attackers etc. Network Security includes practices that reduce the danger of having information get into the wrong hands or keeping undesirable projects or people from distrupting the nature of Service. Recently, the Internet is a key some portion of our regular life and numerous essential and urgent administrations like saving money, shopping, transport, health, and communication are incompletely or totally subject to the Internet. According to recent sources the quantity of hosts associated with the web has expanded to just about 400 million and there are right now more than 1 billion clients of the Internet. Consequently, any disturbance in the operation of the web can be exceptionally badly designed for the majority of us. Attacks are dispatched for an assortment of reasons, including money related addition, maliciousness, fraud, warfare and to gain an economic advantage. Because of the stateless way of the web, the weakening of territory in the flooding stream consolidated with parodied source addresses undermines the traceback procedures for finding the sources.

As of late the DoS attacks are utilized to decrease or wipe out the accessibility of an administration gave over the Internet, to its true clients. DoS attacks are considerably more difficult to protect. In the distributed type of DoS attacks (called DDoS), the attacker first takes control of countless hosts on the web, and after that utilize them to all the while send an enormous flood of bundles to the victim, debilitating the greater part of its assets.

The late DDoS assault utilized profoundly advanced and robotized apparatuses which unexpectedly are promptly accessible over the Internet, to be downloaded and utilized by anybody to assault any Web webpage.

IP traceback is fundamentally strategy for dependably deciding the starting point of a packet on the Internet. The source IP location of a packet is not confirmed, because of the trusting way of the IP protocol. IP traceback is a basic capacity for recognizing health of assaults and founding security measures for the Internet. Most existing ways to deal with this issue have been customized toward DoS assault recognition. The The approaches are like probabilistic packet marking, trace back of active attack flow, deterministic packet marking, router base approach, out of band approach etc.

In Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM), routers probabilistically mark the packets they transmit, so that the victim can follow the attack paths up to their sources, based on the packets it received. A packet is set apart by keeping in touch with the reusable bits in the IP header. The paper moreover gave the accepted marking system. This practice just uses one cryptographic MAC (Message Authentication Code) figuring per checking , which is requests of greatness more able to register and can be balanced so it just requires the 16-bit over-weight IP recognizable proof field for limit. The conspicuous confirmation data ought to be gone to the destination for each present.

Whatever is left of the paper is sorted out as takes after. In area II, we examine past related work on IP Traceback and after that propose another IP traceback plan in segment III. We lead hypothetical investigation in point of interest in segment III. Segment VI conducts reenactment tests. At long last, we close this paper in segment V.

2. RELATED WORK

Today, a Universal medium for an expansive scope of interchanges requires more consideration for securing the Internet infrastructure. This Chapter is to give a portion of the foundation data about the packet marking and Traceback Scheme. In this Chapter we are going to learn about different sorts of different techniques did by others, what are all downsides with those plans and why we have to go for the new plan.

2.1 DoS & DDoS Attack Overview

Denial of Service attack is a type of cybercrime in which assailants over-burden registering or arrange assets with so much activity that genuine clients can't access those assets. The objective of the attacker is to close down an association's business services, for example, ecommerce exchanges, monetary exchanging, email or site access. DoS attacks can be avoided if the spoofed source IP address is traced back its origin by allowing assigned penalties to the offending party.



Fig- 1: A Scenario of DOS Attack

A Distributed Denial of Service assault is regularly described as an event in which a honest client is denied of certain services, similar to web, email or system availability, that they would ordinarily expect to have. The asset can be transmission capacity, memory, CPU cycles, document descriptors, supports etc. Extremely sophisticated, user friendly, automated and effective DDoS toolboxs are accessible for assaulting any victim, so aptitude is not as a matter of course required that draw attract naive users to perform DDoS attacks. Shockingly, there is no simple approach to track IP traffic to its source. This is because of two features of the IP protocol. The first highlight is the straight forwardness with which IP source locations can be forged. The second component is the stateless way of IP routing, where routers regularly know just the next hop for forwarding a

packet, as opposed to the complete end-to-end course taken by every packet. Keeping in mind the end goal to address this restriction, Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) has been proposed to support IP traceability.

2.2 Need of IP Traceback

Currently, there is no single successful system to defend against DDoS attacks. The most ideal defense against DDoS attack lies in preventive measures as well as in distinguishing genuine cause of the attacker to block further DDoS attacks and catch those attackers. This prompts issue of IP Traceback. All in all, IP traceback is characterized as the technique for following back the way crossed by packets utilizing the IP header from source to destination, where the source is the attacker and destination is the victim. With the help of routers and gateways, the traceback procedure is done in the system layer. The goal of IP traceback is to minimize router overhead and the time required to get the trace. IP Traceback makes troublesome for the attacker to hide its identity only by spoofing the source address and ultimately making executing an attack much more tough . IP Traceback is responsible to find attack path through which the attack packet heads out from attacker to victim.



Fig- 2: IP Traceback Problem

2.3 Previous Work on IP Traceback

There is already a vast collection of writing on IP traceback. In this paper, we are keen on Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) schemes. This is rather than the single packet IP traceback approach, which utilized switch state to track the way of a solitary packet, but obliged routers to keep a lot of state.

Bellovin presented ICMP traceback, in which every router tests, with low probability, one of the packets going through it and sends an ICMP traceback message including the substance of the sampled packet and data about the nearby routers along the way to the destination.

Burch proposed controlled flooding, in which the victim remakes attack paths by specifically flooding network routers and observing the change in traffic from the attacker. They said checking packets for IP traceback, either probabilistically or deterministically, with IP addresses of routers they experience.

Savage exhibited the reasonable design and execution of PPM and proposed the Fragment Marking Scheme (FMS), considering the limited number of bits accessible for marking on the IP header. As per FMS, every router's IP address and repetition data is separated into eight 8-bit parts and the router probabilistically denote a packet with one of these eight sections choose random. This methodology works well for a solitary attacker, but suffers from high calculation overhead because of the need to check a large number of combinations of fragments and in addition of false positives in distributed attacks.

Song enhanced the computational efficiency and precision of recreating the attack paths under large scale DDoS by presenting an Advanced Marking Scheme (AMS); they also introduced an authenticated scheme to deal with spoofing from compromised routers. They made the supposition that the victim has earlier learning of the upstream router topology by utilizing the traceroute tool. The objective is then to gather which ways on this map are crossed by the attack traffic.

Yaar proposed Fast Internet Traceback (FIT) which is like the AMS plan in the utilization of the upstream router map and in the packet marking group, however it gets the upstream router map utilizing packet markings as

opposed to the traceroute tool. They utilize a solitary piece along with a TTL modification for the distance value and node sampling rather than the ordinarily utilized edge sampling; they abuse the way that packets that navigate the same way during a TCP connection can be gathered together by the victim.

Dean proposed a logarithmic traceback approach which encodes the data of the nodes in the way as focuses on polynomials. Their plan enhances power both for noise elimination and multi-way reproduction. In any case, the quantity of packets required to reproduce the way is high.

Goodrich displayed another PPM based traceback approach, called randomize and connect. The primary thought is to have every router mark with an irregular fragment of its message together with an extensive checksum cord on its whole message. The scheme does not require an earlier information of the topology, but rather since it doesn't utilize a separation field, it faces issues in remaking the attack chart under huge scale DDoS attacks.

Dong presented Efficient PPM which likewise utilizes a solitary PPM bit, yet diminishes the quantity of packets significantly.

Tseng proposed a change of PPM with non-preemptive compensation, which utilizes counters at routers to make the probability that a marked packet is gotten by the victim equivalent to the checking probability.

Peng presented the Adjusted PPM (APPM) scheme to reduce the number of required packets by utilizing a higher marking probability for routers nearer to the attacker. The thought was to remove the predisposition for routers nearer to the victim, and get an equivalent number of packets set apart by every router on the attack way; they heuristically set the balanced marking probabilities to accomplish that objective and proposed three plans to make APPM practical. The fundamental issue with that approach is that every checking router needs to know its position in the attack path. This is difficult practically speaking, however a few procedures have been proposed to utilize the TTL value in the IP header.

Ma presented the Tabu Marking Scheme (TMS), in which a router respects a packet marked by an upstream router as a tabu and does not check it once more. TMS has the same joining time as overwriting PPM schemes under single-way attacks, however it decreases the convergence time under distributed attacks. Since overwriting of past imprints is not permitted, TMS is defenseless against spoofing by the assailant practically speaking.

2.4 Probabilistic Packet Marking

Park et. al. talked about the probabilistic Packet Marking. It is the strategy in which the packet is marked into account some probability called the marking Probability. Savage proposed probabilistic packet checking (PPM) algorithm to take care of the IP Traceback issue. The thought is to marl packets going through router with its identities (IP address) with some probability. Packet could be marked apart with complete or partial path data of the route. Victim utilizes these marked packets to build full attack path. In this way, The packets are stamped are a subset of total traffic. Every router will figure a marking probability by which the router takes a choice to stamp the packet or not.

Every router denote a packet with Probability p. The probability for a router to check a packet is thought to be the same, when the packet achieves the victim, the further the router is far from the victim, the less plausible it is viewed as "marked" by that router in light of the fact that ensuing switches can "re-mark" packets which have been set apart by past routers. As per [1], given that the likelihood of packet marking at every router is the same, say $p(0<p<1)$ and the aggregate number of hops is d, then the probability of a packet got by the victim that is set apart by the i^{th} $(1<=i<d)$ router along the attack path is $p(1-p)^{d-i}$. The quantity of packets required for the attack path recreation set apart by the i^{th} switch along the attack path is no less than $1/[p(1-p)^{d-i}]$. Marking Probability is based on three factors:

1 Hop count from a Sender.
2 The Filter Router's resource availability.
3 The Filter Router's link degree.

PPM falls into the following categories: basic principle-marking, Processing modes-Probabilistic and Location-Network Group. This approach is based on the idea that all rouers in the attack path select the packets that pass through then randomly, with a constant probability and then mark the selected packets by their own IP address. Due to limited marking space present in IP header partial path information is generally used to mark the packets.

Packet marking field on this packet marking algorithm consists of 16 bit IP identification field in IP header. It is divided into 3 start field(32 bits), end field(32 bits) and distance field.

Rather than recording the entire way data through which the packet crossed, router records just the edge data chose for marking. The begin and end field stores the IP address of routers toward the end purposes of the marked edge. The separation field records the quantity of bounces between the marked edge and the victim. Victim gathers marked packets and inspects the packet header to develop a complete crossed way of the packet. It experiences the issue of extra packets which could prompt unmarked packets to go to victim. Attacker can change attack packets such that the unmarked packets which achieves victim could prompt unusual traceback result.



Fig-3: PPM approach for IP Traceback

In PPM, it is expected that attacking groups are considerably more regular than standard packets. It means the groups probabilistically with some way information and grants the casualty to redo the route in perspective of checked packets. However, packets are stamped discretionarily considering some probability. It is difficult to reproduce the way. It requires high computational work when there are various sources. Various sources could achieve false positive rate.

2.4.1 Definitions

The primary thought of PPM is to give routers a chance to mark the packets with path information probabilistically and let the victim reproduce the attack path utilizing the marked packets. PPM depends on the supposition that when we stamp every bundle with just a little likelihood then the casualty will get sufficient packets to recreate the attack path.

Every router denote a packet with probability p. At the point when the router chooses to check a packet, it composes its own IP address into the edge field and zero into the separation field. Something else, if the separation field is as of now zero, which implies this packet has been set apart by the past router, it forms the packet as takes after: (1) It joins its IP address and the current worth in the edge field and composes the consolidated quality into the edge field. (2) It expands the separation esteem by 1. In this manner, the edge esteem contains both data from the past router and the present router. At long last if the router does not check the packet, then it generally increases the separation field. This separation field shows the quantity of jumps between the victim and the router that has denoted the packet. The separation field ought to be upgraded utilizing immersing expansion, which means the separation field is not permitted to wrap. At the point when utilizing this plan, any packet composed by the attacker will have a separation field more equivalent to the genuine attack path. Interestingly, a packet which is set apart by the router ought to have a separation field which is not exactly the length of the way navigated from that router.



V1, v2	2 (Packet 1)
V2, v3	1 (Packet 2)

Fig- 4. Probabilistic Packet Marking

As we seen in Figure 4, packet 1 is marked with edge value (v1,v2) and distance 2; packet 2 is marked with edge value (v2,v3) and distance 1. When t receives two packets it can reconstruct the attack path (v1,v2,v3).

2.4.2 Observations

In PPM, routers are treated as atomic units of traceback. In fact, the IP address of a router means the IP address of one of its interfaces. Making interfaces the units of traceback enables separation of incoming and outgoing packets with respect to a given interface. This will enable packets travelling in one direction to be treated differently from the packets traveling in another direction.

Security issues of PPM schemes arise from the fact that an attacker can inject a packet, which is marked with erroneous information. Such behavior is called mark spoofing. Prevention of such behavior is accomplished by special coding techniques, and is not 100% proof. If every packet, which arrives to the victim is ensured to be correctly marked, then the need in those complex and processor intensive encoding techniques will be unnecessary. We propose to ensure that all the packets which travel through the network are marked by the routers on the network. In this case, even if an attacker will try to spoof the mark, his spoofed mark will be overwritten with a correct mark.

3. LITERATURE SURVEY

Stefan Savage, David Wetherall et al [1] describe a technique for tracing anonymous packet flooding attacks in the Internet back toward their source. This work is motivated by the increased frequency and sophistication of denial of service attacks and by the difficulty in tracing packets with incorrect, or "spoofed," source addresses. They described a general purpose traceback mechanism based on probabilistic packet marking in the network. The approach allows a victim to identify the network paths traversed by attack traffic without requiring interactive operational support from Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Moreover, this traceback can be performed "post mortem" after an attack has completed. They present an implementation of this technology that is incrementally deployable, backward compatible, and can be efficiently implemented using conventional technology.

Dawn Xiaodong Song and Adrian Perrig et al [2] describe two new schemes, the Advanced Marking Scheme and the Authenticated Marking Scheme, which allow the victim to traceback the approximate origin of spoofed IP packets. Their techniques feature low network and router overhead, and support incremental deployment. In contrast to previous work, their techniques have significantly higher precision (lower false positive rate) and lower computation overhead for the victim to reconstruct the attack paths under large scale distributed denial of service attacks. Furthermore the Authenticated Marking Scheme provides efficient authentication of routers' markings such that even a compromised router cannot forge or tamper markings from other uncompromised routers.

Abraham Yaar, Adrian Perrig and Dawn Song et al [3] proposed IP traceback mechanisms are inadequate to address the traceback problem for the following reasons: they require DDoS victims to gather thousands of packets to reconstruct a single attack path; they do not scale to large scale Distributed DoS attacks; and they do not support incremental deployment. They propose Fast Internet Traceback (FIT), a new packet marking approach that significantly improves IP traceback in several dimensions: (1) victims can identify attack paths with high probability after receiving only tens of packets, a reduction of 1–3 orders of magnitude compared to previous packet marking schemes; (2) FIT performs well even in the presence of legacy routers, allowing every FIT-enabled router in path to be identified; and (3) FIT scales to large distributed attacks with thousands of attackers. Compared with previous packet marking schemes, FIT represents a step forward in performance and deployability.

Michael T. Goodrich et al [4] presents an approach to IP traceback based on the probabilistic packet marking paradigm. Their approach, which is called randomize and link, uses large checksum cords to "link" message fragments in a way that is highly scalable, for the checksums serve both as associative addresses and data integrity verifiers. The main advantage of these checksum cords is that they spread the addresses of possible router messages across a spectrum that is too large for the attacker to easily create messages that collide with legitimate messages.

Chao Gong and Kamil Sarac et al [5] propose a new PPM approach that improves the current state of the art in two practical directions: (1) it improves the efficiency and accuracy of IP traceback and (2) it provides incentives for ISPs to deploy IP traceback in their networks. Their PPM approach employs a new IP header encoding scheme to store the whole identification information of a router into a single packet. This eliminates the computation overhead and false positives due to router identification fragmentation. The approach does not disclose the IP addresses of the routers having marked packets, thereby all eviating the ISP's security concern of disclosing network topology. The approach is able to control the distribution of marking information. Hence, it is suitable to be deployed as a value added service which may create revenue for ISPs. Therefore that PPM approach improves the performance and practicability of IP traceback.

Kichang Kim, Jeankyung Kim and Jinsoo Hwang et al [6] focus on Probabilistic Packet Marking scheme (PPM) with tagging. They believe PPM is more advantageous than others because it does not generate additional network traffic and requires minimal protocol change. However, three parameters need to be optimized to make PPM practical under massively multiple attack paths: the number of packets to collect, the number of fragment combinations to recover the IP addresses, and the false positive error rate. Tagging is an effective way to reduce the number of combinations but it increases the false positive error rates when the number of routers in the attack paths grows. Other PPM related techniques suggested in the past have similar problems. They improve one or two parameters at the expense of others, or they require additional data structures such as an upstream router map. They propose a method that optimizes the three parameters at the same time and recovers original IPs quickly and correctly even in the presence of massive multiple attack paths. Their method does not need either a combinatorial process to recover IPs or additional information such as an upstream router map. The result shows that the method recovers 95% of the original IPs correctly with no fragment combinations and with zero false positives. It needs to collect only 8N packets per router where N is the number of routers involved in the attack paths.

Hongcheng Tian, Jun Bi and Xiaoke Jiang et al [7] present Adaptive Probabilistic Marking scheme (APM). In APM, when each packet enters the first-hop router, its TTL value is set to a uniform value, and when it is forwarded by routers in the network, each intermediate router decreases the TTL value by one. Consequently, each intermediate router may infer the router-level hop number that each packet has already traveled, and then correspondingly marks the packet with the probability inversely proportional to the router level hop number. APM is focused on the probability with which a router marks a packet, and APM can cooperate with other probabilistic marking schemes. NS2 simulation experiments prove that, in APM, the time for the victim to receive necessary marks for the path reconstruction is reduced by more than 20% compared with existing probabilistic marking schemes and spoofed marks can not reach the victim and influence the traceback process.

Ashwani Parashar and Dr Ramaswami Radhakrishnan et al [8] survey that the attack on its infrastructure poses a great challenge in its expansion. Distributed Denial of Service attacks is major source of attacks over the past decade. The goal of the attacker is to spoof the source of IP address to hide its source. Various IP traceback schemes such as Probabilistic Packet Marking, Deterministic Packet marking, TTL base Packet Marking and Hash base IP traceback schemes are proposed to trace source of the attacker. This paper discusses the Improved Deterministic Packet Marking Algorithm that is effective in taking appropriate action for the spoof packets along with identification of attacker.

Kayoko Iwamoto, Masakazu Soshi and Takashi Satoh et al [9] studied that IP traceback protocols must be effective as well as simple enough to be efficiently executed. However, there is almost no such an IP traceback protocol. They consider an IP traceback protocol proposed by Muthuprasanna and Manimaran (STE scheme for short) and shall propose a new, efficient and adaptive IP traceback scheme, which is partly based on STE. Simply speaking, their scheme is efficient since it adaptively changes marking probabilities to decrease the number of marking bits. They conduct theoretical and numerical analyses of their scheme in detail and show that their scheme is more efficient than STE in terms of marking bit length and the number of packets for attack path recovery. The result is also supported by simulation experiments.

Karanpreet Singh, Paramvir Singh and Krishan Kumar et al [10] studied Internet has always been vulnerable to a variety of security threats as it was originally designed without apprehending the prospect of

security concerns. Modern era has seen diverse nature of attacks possible on the Internet, including the most perilous attack, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. In such an attack, a large number of compromised systems coordinate with each other so as to direct gigantic magnitude of attack traffic toward the victim, depleting its tangible and intangible network resources. To further exacerbate the situation, these compromised systems usually disguise their identity by capitalizing on IP address spoofing. They followed a systematic approach to comprehensively review and categorize 275 works representing existing IP traceback literature. They also provides an in-depth analysis of different IP traceback approaches, their functional classes and the evaluation metrics.

3.1 proposed Approach

To accomplish the Denial of Service (DoS) attack, the attacker does not send the packets specifically from the machine, First, The security of other powerless security machines is bargained by utilizing any of the effectively accessible strategies or system. Thus, it is elusive the health of attacks. Different IP traceback, for example, Packet Marking (incorporates Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) and Deterministic Packet Marking), Log-based and ICMP plans are proposed to follow wellspring of the assault. Existing methodologies are experienced high overhead, high false positive and no stamping verification in this manner we propose IP traceback approach with checking validation.

Denial of Service (DoS) attacks specify that there is requirement for quick and productive traceback plan because of unavoidable dangers. A good traceback Scheme has the following features:

1 Recognition and Exclusion of false information injected by the attacker.
2 Avoiding the use of large amount of packets to construct the traceback path.
3 Low Processing and storage overhead at intermediate routers.
4 If the packet information is stored at the intermediate routers then collectiong this information must be efficient.

3.2 Flow Chart

Flow chart is the diagram of the algorithm or process. That shows the basic execution steps of various kinds and their order by connecting them with arrows.



Fig-5: Flowchart for PPM using Key Exchange Algorithm

3.3 Marking Mechanism



Fig- 6: Marking Mechanism

Proposed work is divided into two main processes:

(1) Packet Marking
(2) Path Reconstruction Algorithm

(1) Packet Marking

In the packet marking procedure, the packets randomly encode every node of the attack path.



Fig- 7: Packet Marking

(2) Path Reconstruction Algorithm

The path reconstruction procedure obtains the constructed graph from this encoded information.



Fig- 8: Path Reconstruction Algorithm

3.4 Performance Criteria

- Victim side Overhead
- False Positive
- High Accuracy
- Low Network and Router Overhead

3.5 Parameters

We have analyzed our approach for following parameters:
1. Number of Packets required
2. No of false positives
3. Processing time for attack path reconstruction

3.5.1 Based on Number of Packets required



Chart-1: Based on Number of Packets Required

3.5.2 Based on Number of False Positives



Chart-2: Based on Number of Packets Required

3.5.3 Based on Required Time



Chart-3: Based on Number of Packets Required

From the above graph, we analyze that the proposed approach require few more packets and few more milliseconds compare to existing deterministic approach. However, the proposed approach give the benefit of zero false positive and incremental deployment.

4. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS

We have simulated our approach and evaluated our approach with many parameters as discussed in previous section. The simulation is carried out in Java language. The assumptions that are made during simulation are as follows the network topology that considered.

4.1 Simulation

We have simulated our approach and evaluated our approach for 128 nodes topology(a), 256 nodes topology(b) and 512 nodes topology(c). The simulation result is shown in following figure 9.



(a) For 128 nodes Topology



(b) For 256 Nodes Topology



(c) For 512 Nodes Topology

Fig-9: Simulated network in NS2

5. CONCLUSIONS

IP traceback is today need as number of attacks based on IP Spoofing are increasingly. Many IP traceback has been prepared. However, they suffers from many limitations. Therefore we prepare IP traceback method, that require less space, few no of packets. In existing approach number of attacker are increase then the number of required packet are also increase but in our proposed method number of required packet are less. In existing system number of false positive are more and proposed the number of false positive is zero. In future work, we want extend the proposed work for authentication of marking.

6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am very grateful to Dr. A. C. Suthar, Principal of L. J. Institute of Engineering and Technology for providing facilities to achieve the desire milestone. I also extend my thanks to Head of Department Prof. Gayatri Pandi for her inspiration and continuous support. I wish to warmly thank my guide, Prof. Gayatri Pandi(Jain) for all her diligence, guidance, encouragement, inspiration and motivation throughout. Without her treasurable advice and assistance it would not have been possible for me to attain this landmark. She has always been willingly present whenever I needed the slightest support from her. I would like to thank all of them whose name are not

mentioned here but have played a significant role in any way to accomplish the work. Grace of the almighty God and blessings of my parents have formed the path to reach my desire goal.

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