A Critical Review and Modern Contextualization of the 2009 Distributed Real-Time Computer Network Architecture (DRNA)

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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a critical review of the 2009 paper, "Verification of Distributed Real-Time Computer Network Architecture Associated With Off-The-Shelf and Dedicated Technologies," by Serizawa et al.. The 2009 work introduced the Distributed Real-Time Computer Network Architecture (DRNA) as a hybrid solution to bridge the gap between legacy, proprietary power system communication networks and the emerging adoption of COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) IP-based technologies. This review deconstructs the four-layer DRNA framework, focusing on its novel "Adaptation Function" middleware, which successfully created deterministic-like performance for soft real-time applications. We critically analyze the empirical evidence from the 2009 paper's hardware-in-the-loop experiment, validating its key findings on real-time QoS, network reliability, and application-layer resilience using a distributed Voltage and Reactive Power Control (VQC) application. The 2009 paper's choice of a "mobile agent" paradigm for cooperative control is identified as a novel but ultimately flawed implementation. This review provides a comprehensive update, contextualizing DRNA's architectural principles against modern (post-2024) standards, including Software-Defined Networking (SDN), Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN), and the maturation of IEC 61850 and IEC 62351. We conclude that while DRNA's specific implementation is dated, its core principles of architectural modularity, application-aware networking, and distributed cooperative control have become foundational to modern grid communication architectures.

Keyword : - *DRNA, Power System Communication, Real-Time Networks, SCADA, IEC 61850, MPLS, QoS, Mobile Agents, Critical Infrastructure, SDN, TSN, Critical Review.*

1. INTRODUCTION: THE 2009 MILESTONE IN UTILITY NETWORKING

In 2009, the electric utility industry was at a critical juncture. For decades, power system operation and maintenance networks relied on proprietary, isolated, and often circuit-switched (TDM/SONET) technologies. This approach was justified, as Serizawa et al. noted, because "reliability and security are of the utmost importance" [1, p. 1206]. However, this legacy path was in direct conflict with mounting pressures for "reductions in the cost of system construction" and "increased interconnectivity among control devices" [1, p. 1206]. The industry was being pushed, reluctantly, toward "off-the-shelf and standardized techniques," specifically Internet-Protocol (IP)-based networks [1, p. 1206], [2], [3].

The core problem was a perceived mismatch: how to run deterministic, mission-critical applications on "best-effort" IP networks. Into this conflict, the paper by Serizawa et al. [1] introduced the Distributed Real-Time Computer Network Architecture (DRNA). DRNA was proposed as a pragmatic, hybrid solution. Its stated goal was to "achieve seamless, real-time, adaptive, and secure information exchange" by artfully *combining* COTS technologies (like IP, Ethernet, and MPLS) with "dedicated ones"—namely, a novel middleware layer [1, p. 1206].

The purpose of this review paper is threefold:

1. To deconstruct the functional components and architectural principles of the DRNA framework as proposed in [1].
2. To critically analyze the empirical evidence from the paper's experimental verification, assessing its claims of real-time, reliable, and resilient performance.
3. To provide a critical update by evaluating the legacy and scalability of DRNA's 2009 technology choices against the dominant, standardized paradigms of the 2020s, such as Software-Defined Networking (SDN), Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN), 5G, and the full maturation of the IEC 61850 standard [4], [5], [6].

The 2009 paper [1] should be viewed as more than a simple technical report; it was a persuasive argument aimed at a deeply conservative utility industry. The entire experimental setup, detailed in its Section IV, was designed to *prove* that a hybrid IP-based system could not only survive network failures and manage congestion but also enable advanced applications that improve grid resilience [1, p. 1215]. It served as a crucial, evidence-based stepping stone, providing utilities with the confidence to begin migrating operational (SCADA) networks from legacy circuits to modern packet-based infrastructures [7].

Table - 1: Summary of the Primary Paper Under Review

Reference	Year	Key Contribution
Serizawa et al. [1]	2009	Proposed and empirically verified DRNA, a hybrid network architecture using COTS (IP/MPLS) and dedicated middleware to guarantee real-time, reliable, and secure communication for power systems.

2. DECONSTRUCTING THE DRNA FRAMEWORK

The DRNA framework's elegance lies in its modular, four-layer functional structure, illustrated in Figure 1 of the original paper [1, p. 1208]. This separation of concerns was a key design choice, allowing COTS components and dedicated software to cooperate.



Fig - 1: Functional structure of DRNA. (Source: Serizawa et al. [1, p. 1208])

The four functional entities were:

1. **Application Program and Information Model:** This layer held the business logic (e.g., power system applications) and the data definitions. The authors correctly identified the nascent IEC 61970 (CIM) and IEC 61850 (Logical Nodes) as the future of object-oriented, standardized information models [1, p. 1209], which have since been fully realized [4].
2. **Adaptation Function:** This was the ”secret sauce” and most novel component of DRNA. It served as an abstraction and policy layer between the applications and the transport network.
3. **Transport Function:** This was the COTS IP network itself, responsible for packet forwarding. The paper evaluated both MPLS and wide-area Ethernet as viable options [1, p. 1210].
4. **Network and Security Management:** This layer comprised standard functions like SNMP for management and IPsec-VPNs or VLANs for security and network separation [1, p. 1210].

Table - 2: DRNA FUNCTIONAL ENTITIES AND TECHNOLOGY CHOICES (2009) [1]

Functional Entity	Function / Role	Technologies Employed in [1]
Application	Distributed VQC, Information Exchange	Mobile Agents (SCA, CA, RA), IEC 61850/61970 Models, Java RMI
Adaptation	QoS, Reliability, API	Custom Middleware (Java-based), ToS Setting, Priority Control, Redundant Transmission (Second Arrival Discard)
Transport	Packet Forwarding (COTS)	Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) with DiffServ, Wide-Area Ethernet with 802.1Q VLAN/STP
Security	Isolation, Encryption	IPsec-VPN, Access Control Lists (ACLs), Physical/Logical Network Separation

The true innovation of DRNA was its ”Adaptation Function,” a custom middleware designed to ”ensure real-time and reliable interobject communication” [1, p. 1208]. This middleware performed two critical roles, as detailed in Table III of the original paper [1, p. 1209]:

- **Enforcing Real-Time Features:** It translated high-level application priorities into low-level network-specific QoS (Quality of Service) markings, such as the Type of Service (ToS) or DiffServ (DSCP) bits in an IP header. It also performed ”Transmitter priority control” and ”Receiver priority control” to schedule packet emission and processing, ensuring critical data (like SCADA commands) was handled before non-critical data (like video surveillance) [1, p. 1209].
- **Enforcing Reliability:** The middleware implemented its own application-layer reliability scheme, ”Redundant or double route transmission,” which simultaneously sent critical packets over two separate network paths. A ”second arrival discard” mechanism at the receiving end ensured only the first packet was processed [1, p. 1209]. This effectively masked network-level failures from the application.

This architecture was remarkably prescient. The DRNA framework is, in effect, a ”proto-SDN” (Software-Defined Networking) architecture. It cleanly separated the application’s *intent* (the ”Application” layer defines *what* is important) from the network’s forwarding mechanics (the ”Transport” layer just moves packets). The ”Adaptation Function” acted as a distributed *controller* or *policy layer*, translating that application intent into specific network behaviors (e.g., ”set ToS bits,” ”send on redundant paths”). This conceptual separation of application, control, and transport planes is the foundational principle of all modern, application-aware utility networks [8], [9].
Table 2 synthesizes the functional components and specific technologies chosen by Serizawa et al. [1].

3. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY: AGENT-BASED VQC

To validate their architecture, Serizawa et al. [1] constructed a high-fidelity, small-scale testbed—a crucial step in moving from theory to practice. The verification was conducted on a 3.3 kV AC/DC Power System Simulator, creating a realistic hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) environment. Control was implemented using Linux-based PCs and Java-based IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices), referred to as NCTs [1, pp. 1211-1212, Fig. 4].



Fig - 2: Configuration of demonstration test system. (Source: Serizawa et al. [1, p. 1211])

The application chosen for the test was a ”distributed cooperative voltage and reactive power control (VQC)” program [1, p. 1212]. This was a ”soft” real-time application, with a 1-second latency requirement typical for SCADA systems [1, p. 1207]. The *implementation* of this VQC logic, however, was the most unconventional choice in the paper: **mobile agents**.
This paradigm, popular in 2000s-era distributed computing research, was embodied in three types of agents detailed in Table VII of the original paper [1, p. 1212]:

- **Substation Control Agent (SCA):** A stationary agent that resided at each substation to perform local VQC (e.g., switch capacitors) based on local voltage.
- **Coordination Agent (CA):** A *mobile* agent, described as an ”autonomous and intelligent program” [1, p. 1209], that could *move* from one node to another. Its role was to 1) inform other SCAs of a control action to prevent ”hunting” (conflicting operations) or 2) ”ask another SCA... to perform voltage control” when local capacity was insufficient [1, p. 1212].
- **Report Agent (RA):** A mobile agent that collected event reports and *moved* to the control center to deliver them.

This choice of mobile agents reveals the authors’ focus on ”autonomous decentralized schemes” [1, p. 1212].
The *goal* was laudable: create a resilient, distributed system that did not depend on a single, monolithic SCADA master. However, the *implementation* via mobile agents was, in retrospect, a novel but flawed choice. This paradigm is fraught with practical problems, including:

1. **Security:** A roving piece of executable code presents an enormous attack surface. How does a substation authenticate an agent that ”moves” to it?
2. **State Management:** What happens if the network fails while the agent is in transit? Its state could be lost, crippling the control logic.
3. **Efficiency:** Sending an entire program (even a Java agent) across the network is far less efficient than sending a small, standardized data message.

As will be discussed in Section 5, modern systems achieve the *exact same goal* of distributed, cooperative control using lightweight, standardized, and secure peer-to-peer messages (e.g., IEC 61850 GOOSE [5]), which have proven to be a far more robust and scalable solution.

4. ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

Despite the methodological critique of mobile agents, the experimental results presented in Section IV of [1] are the paper's most significant contribution. They provide clear, quantitative evidence that the DRNA *worked* as designed.

4.1 Real-Time and QoS Performance

Figure 7 from the original paper ("Prioritized transmission by adaptation function middleware") is the core proof of DRNA's real-time capability [1, p. 1214]. It measured latency for three traffic classes (High-priority/Telemetry, Medium/Maintenance, Low/Video) under light and heavy network loads.

- **Finding (Without Load):** Under light traffic, the High-priority (redundant) traffic had a slightly *higher* mean latency (< 5 ms) than the Low-priority (best-effort) traffic. This was expected and attributed to the processing overhead of the adaptation middleware.
- **Finding (With Heavy Load):** This was the key test. When the network was congested to near 100% capacity, the Low-priority latency *exploded* to an "Not guaranteed" state (over 15 ms). In contrast, the High-priority and Medium-priority traffic latencies remained stable and low (~5–7 ms).

This result *proves* the DRNA Adaptation Function's core concept. The middleware successfully isolated critical traffic from non-critical "best-effort" traffic, even on the *same physical COTS network*. It effectively *created* a predictable, deterministic-like service for the VQC application.



Fig. 7. Prioritized transmission by adaptation function middleware.

Fig - 3: Prioritized transmission by adaptation function middleware. (Source: Serizawa et al. [1, p. 1214])

4.2 Reliability and Redundancy

The authors tested single points of failure on both the MPLS and Ethernet transport networks [1, p. 1213].

- **Finding (Network-Level):** The network's built-in recovery (MPLS link protection or Ethernet Multiple STP) was fast, but not instantaneous, with disruptions ranging from a "few milliseconds to one second" (MPLS) to "0.2- to 1-s" (STP) [1, pp. 1213-2014].

- **Finding (Application-Level):** Critically, the authors report that ”no disruption of communications in the VQC application layer occurred” [1, p. 1214].

This ”belt and suspenders” approach to reliability was a complete success. The application-layer redundancy (”double-redundant route” and ”second arrival discard”) in the middleware completely masked the network-level reconvergence events from the VQC application, making the COTS network appear 100% reliable.

Table - 3: SUMMARY OF DRNA EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION RESULTS [1]

Test Category	Key Finding from [1]	Verdict
Real-Time (QoS)	Middleware priority (Fig. 7) protected critical traffic (5–7 ms) from network congestion (15ms+).	**Success**
Reliability (Network)	Application-layer redundancy (”no disruption”) successfully masked network-level MPLS/STP recovery (0–1s).	**Success**
Application (VQC)	Cooperative logic (CA) successfully recovered voltage from equipment failure; non-cooperative (no CA) failed (Fig. 8).	**Success**
Temporal (Timing)	All control loop actions completed well within the 1-second requirement for SCADA (Table XII).	**Success**

4.3 Application-Layer Efficacy

The most operationally significant finding is detailed in Figure 8 (”Performance of VQC operation”) [1, p. 1215]. This test compared VQC performance *with* and *without* the Coordination Agent (CA) during a *power equipment failure* (a shunt capacitor, SC1, was rendered inoperable).

- **Finding (Without CA - Fig 8b):** A load increase caused a voltage drop. The local SCA tried to turn on the faulty SC1, which was ”ineffective.” It then tried SC2, also ”ineffective.” The VQC operation *failed*, and the substation voltage remained below its required dead band.
- **Finding (With CA - Fig 8a):** The same failure occurred (Event 3, 4). The local SCA failed. This time, a Coordination Agent was dispatched (Event 5). The agent ”moves... to solicit assistance” [1, p. 1215] from a neighboring power station. The power station (PS D) received the request and turned up its AQR tap (Event 6), successfully providing remote voltage support. The substation voltage *recovered* into the dead band.

This result proves that the *distributed, cooperative logic* (enabled by the CA) was essential for resilience against *power equipment failures*, not just network failures. It directly linked DRNA’s advanced application architecture to tangible improvements in grid reliability.

4.4 Temporal Characteristics

Finally, Table XII (”Temporal characteristics”) [1, p. 1215] provides the quantitative validation. It shows that all critical operations—Monitoring, Data collection, and Agent operation—were completed in an ”Interval of 1 s” or ”Up to 1 s.” The final control signal emission was ∼500 ms [1, p. 1215]. These timings all fall comfortably *within* the 1-second deterministic requirement for SCADA applications defined earlier in the paper [1, p. 1207]. Table 3 summarizes the key validation findings from [1].

5. DRNA IN A MODERN (POST-2009) CONTEXT: AN UPDATE

The 2009 paper was a forward-looking proof of concept. Over the 15+ years since its publication, the utility industry has undergone a radical transformation, largely adopting the IP-based migration that DRNA helped validate [2], [7]. This section provides a critical update, evaluating DRNA’s design choices against modern standards.

5.1 The Evolution of Transport (MPLS/STP vs. SDN/TSN/5G)

DRNA’s use of MPLS with DiffServ (ToS) and multiple STP [1, p. 1210] was state-of-the-art for providing QoS over a COTS WAN/LAN in 2009.



Event number	Time after Event #1	Event (Type of control)	Tracks of Coordination Agent
1	00:00	Additional load paralleled	
2	00:13	Turn on SC3 at SS C (Local control)	SS C→SS B→SS C to prevent hunting
	00:18	Turn on SC1 at SS B (Local control, ineffective)	SS B→SS C→SS B to prevent hunting
3	00:28	Turn on SC4 at SS C (Local control)	SS C→SS B→SS C to prevent hunting
	00:47	Turn on SC2 at SS B (Local control, ineffective)	SS B→SS C→SS B to prevent hunting
4	01:06	Turn up AQR tap at PS D (Cooperative assistance)	SS C→SS B→PS D→SS C to solicit assistance
5	01:42	Turn up AQR tap at PS A (Cooperative assistance)	SS B→SS C→PS A→SS B to solicit assistance
6	01:54	Turn up AQR tap at PS D (Cooperative assistance)	SS C→SS B→PS D→SS C to solicit assistance
7	03:16	Turn up AQR tap at PS D (Cooperative assistance)	SS C→SS B→PS D→SS C to solicit assistance
8	07:11	Turn up AQR tap at PS D (Cooperative assistance)	SS C→SS B→PS D→SS C to solicit assistance

(a)



Event number	Time after Event #1	Event (Type of control)	Tracks of Coordination Agent
1	00:00	Additional load paralleled	
2	00:14	Turn on SC3 at SS C (Local control)	Coordination Agent disabled
	00:22	Turn on SC1 at SS B (Local control, ineffective)	
3	00:33	Turn on SC4 at SS C (Local control)	
	00:54	Turn on SC2 at SS B (Local control, ineffective)	

(b)

Fig - 4: Performance of VQC operation with the coordination agent in the case of faulty (inoperable) SC1 at Substation B. (Source: Serizawa et al. [1, p. 1215])

- **Modern Equivalent (SDN):** The ”proto-SDN” concept embedded in the DRNA Adaptation Function is now fully realized by Software-Defined Networking. A central SDN controller can manage QoS, security, and redundant paths with far more dynamism and granularity than static MPLS Traffic Engineering or ToS bit-marking [8], [10], [11], [12]. SDN-based control is now a major research area for utility networks [13].
- **Modern Equivalent (TSN):** For *deterministic* (hard) real-time applications—which DRNA explicitly excluded (e.g., protection) [1, p. 1207]—Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN, an IEEE 802.1 standard) has emerged [6]. TSN provides *guaranteed* latency and zero packet loss over standard Ethernet, a COTS solution for the sub-millisecond determinism [6], [14] DRNA’s authors thought required proprietary tech. The integration of SDN and TSN is also a promising solution [15], [16].
- **Modern Equivalent (5G):** For WAN connectivity, private 5G/LTE with network slicing offers a COTS wireless solution to the DRNA’s goals [17]. Slicing provides guaranteed, isolated QoS for different applications (e.g., protection, SCADA, video) over a single infrastructure, fructose DRNA’s traffic separation (Fig. 3) at the carrier level.

5.2 The Evolution of Application (Mobile Agents vs. Microservices & IEC 61850)

This is the most significant divergence. The custom ”mobile agent” paradigm [1, p. 1212] did not survive. It has been completely superseded, though its *function* remains.

- **Modern Equivalent (IEC 61850):** The *function* of the DRNA agents is now fully standardized in IEC 61850 [4]. The SCA’s local control is standard IED logic. The RA’s reporting is handled by IEC 61850 MMS (Manufacturing Message Specification) reports. Most importantly, the *cooperative VQC logic* of the Coordination Agent (Fig. 4a) is now implemented using **IEC 61850 GOOSE** (Generic Object Oriented

Substation Events) [5]. An IED can publish a GOOSE message (”My voltage is low, and I am out of capacitors”) that all its peers subscribe to, allowing a neighboring IED to take cooperative action—exactly what the CA did, but in a standardized, lightweight, secure, and robust (non-”moving”) way.

- **Modern Equivalent (Microservices):** The *packaging* of the agent logic (a Java program) [1, p. 1210] is now replaced by microservices. A complex application like VQC can be containerized (e.g., Docker) and orchestrated (e.g., Kubernetes) on ”edge computing” platforms within the substation, offering far greater flexibility and manageability than the 2009 Java agent platform [18], [19], [20], [21].

Table - 4: DRNA (2009) vs. MODERN UTILITY NETWORK EQUIVALENTS (2024+)

Function / Goal	**DRNA Technology (2009) [1]** **Modern Equivalent (2024+)**
QoS-Managed Transport	MPLS (DiffServ), Ethernet (802.1Q) *Modern: SDN [8, 10], 5G Slicing [17], TSN [6, 15]*
Distributed Coop. Control	Mobile Coordination Agent (CA) *Modern: IEC 61850 GOOSE (Peer-to-Peer) [5]*
Application Logic	Java-based Mobile Agents *Modern: Containerized Microservices (Edge) [18–20]*
Information Model	IEC 61850 / 61970 (Preliminary) *Modern: IEC 61850 (Matured & Standardized) [4]*
Network Security	IPsec-VPN, ACLs *Modern: NERC CIP [22], IEC 62351 (App-layer) [23]*

5.3 The Evolution of Security (IPsec/ACLs vs. IEC 62351 & NERC CIP)

DRNA’s security (IPsec-VPNs and ACLs) [1, p. 1213] was standard for 2009 enterprise IT but was basic. The modern grid, especially in North America, operates under a far more comprehensive and regulated ”Defense in Depth” architecture. This includes:

- **NERC CIP:** Mandatory, auditable reliability and security regulations for the North American bulk electric system [22].
- **IEC 62351:** A technical standard that provides *application-layer* security for IEC 61850 [23], including authentication and encryption of the very GOOSE and MMS messages that have replaced DRNA’s agents.

This is part of a broader shift toward advanced intrusion detection systems and ”Zero Trust” architectures [24], [25].
Table 4 provides a clear ”at-a-glance” update of the DRNA’s technologies. I have also inserted the placeholder for Figure 2 here, as no image was provided for it.

6. RE-EVALUATING CORE LIMITATIONS: SCALABILITY AND REAL-TIME JAVA

To their credit, the authors of [1] were candid about the limitations of their study, which they noted ”is still in its early stages” [1, p. 1216]. This review re-evaluates their two primary concerns.

6.1 The Scalability Challenge

The authors admitted, ”Experiments are needed to verify its expandability or scalability... performance of a control system with tens to hundreds of control devices connected to a wider network” [1, p. 1216].
This was the paper’s primary, unaddressed weakness. The ”small-scale system” [1, p. 1211] (Fig. 2 shows 4 main station nodes) is not representative of a real-world utility network. The ”mobile agent” architecture, in particular, scales exceptionally poorly. The cooperative VQC (Fig. 4a) relied on a CA *moving* sequentially to ”solicit assistance.” In a network of ”tens to hundreds of control devices” [1, p. 1216], this sequential, stateful-hop-by-hop process would be far too slow, almost certainly violating the 1-second real-time requirement (Table XII in [1]). The modern GOOSE equivalent, which uses a single, lightweight multicast message received by all peers *simultaneously*, is vastly superior for this reason [5]. This scalability challenge is a primary driver for modern SDN-based control plane architectures [26].

6.2 The ”Real-Time Java” Concern

The authors also noted that ”Java-based software had a shortcoming with respect to processing performance... automatic memory management, known as garbage collection,” which could introduce unpredictable pauses [1, p. 1215].
This was a valid concern in 2009. A ”stop-the-world” garbage collection (GC) pause in the middleware or agent could easily exceed the 1-second budget, failing the VQC operation. However, this concern is now largely mitigated for this *class* of application:

1. **Soft Real-Time:** The VQC application, with its 1-second tolerance [1, p. 1215], is a *soft* real-time system, not a *hard* real-time one (like 4ms-line protection, which DRNA excluded [1, p. 1207]).
2. **Modern JVMs:** Modern Java Virtual Machines (JVMs) offer low-pause GC collectors (e.g., ZGC, Shenandoah) that reduce pauses to milliseconds, well within budget.
3. **Faster Hardware:** Modern IED and edge computing CPUs are orders of magnitude faster than the 2009-era hardware, making GC pauses comparatively negligible [18].

In summary, the scalability question was a *fundamental flaw* in the mobile agent architecture. The Java question was a *minor, implementation-specific concern* that time and technology have since resolved.

7. CONCLUSION: THE LASTING IMPACT OF THE DRNA VERIFICATION

The 2009 paper by Serizawa et al. [1] stands as a landmark publication, capturing a critical transition point in the history of utility communications. Its enduring legacy is its *empirical demonstration* that a hybrid architecture, combining COTS IP/MPLS/Ethernet with a dedicated adaptation layer, could successfully meet the stringent utility requirements for soft real-time performance (Fig. 3), network reliability (Section 4.2), and advanced application resilience (Fig. 4).
This review finds that while the *specific implementation*—particularly the use of Java-based mobile agents—is dated and has been superseded by more robust, secure, and scalable standards, the *core principles* of DRNA are more relevant than ever. These durable principles include:

1. **Architectural Modularity:** The clean four-layer separation of concerns [7].
2. **Application-Aware Networking:** The ”proto-SDN” concept of an Adaptation Function to translate application intent into network behavior [8], [9].
3. **Distributed, Cooperative Control:** The logic of the Coordination Agent, which proved essential for resilience and is now embodied in the IEC 61850 GOOSE standard [5].

The Serizawa et al. paper served as a vital proof-of-concept that helped de-risk the industry’s migration to IP. It is a testament to the fact that while the *technologies* that implement them are in constant evolution [27], [28], the *principles* of good system design—modularity, resilience, and adaptation—are timeless.

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