

THE ROHINGYA REFUGEE CRISIS - IMPACT ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF BANGLADESH

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ABSTRACT

The Rohingya refugee crisis has appeared as a significant challenge with profound implications for the national security of Bangladesh. This paper examines the multifaceted impact of the influx of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar on Bangladesh's security landscape. Since 2017, over a million Rohingya have sought refuge in Cox's Bazar, straining local resources and infrastructure. The presence of such a large refugee population has worsened economic pressures, heightened social tensions, and created potential breeding grounds for criminal activities and radicalisation. The crisis also has political ramifications, influencing domestic policies and international diplomacy. The government's response has involved balancing humanitarian needs with national security concerns, often under intense international scrutiny. International aid and involvement have provided some relief, but long-term solutions are still elusive. This study analyses the crisis's economic, social, and political dimensions, exploring how it affects internal stability and national security. Additionally, the crisis has intensified border security issues and diplomatic strains between Bangladesh and Myanmar. By assessing government responses and international involvement, this paper aims to comprehensively understand the security challenges posed by the Rohingya refugee crisis. It will examine the measures taken to address these challenges and their effectiveness. Finally, this paper will propose policy recommendations to mitigate these risks, ensuring the stability and security of Bangladesh. The goal is to offer insights to help policymakers navigate the complex interplay of humanitarian and security concerns posed by the Rohingya refugee crisis.

Keywords: National security, Security challenges, Crisis, Rohingya refugee, Law enforcement.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Identification of the Problem

1.1.1 The Rohingya people are stateless Indo-Aryan-speaking Muslim minority people who reside in North Rakhine State in western Myanmar or Burma (Wikipedia, 2018). Since 1982, Myanmar has forced statelessness and rights deprivation upon more than 1.1 million Rohingya. Over 900,000 refugees in Bangladesh have been a crisis that has stretched resources to the limit because ASEAN has started to tackle it from a regional perspective.

1.1.2 Moving beyond territorial defence, national security now covers politics, the military, the environment, etc. It protects sovereignty, preserves national identity, reduces dependence on foreign countries, and maintains internal order (Hossain, 2009; Bari,2007). However, despite the staggering challenges of overpopulation, Bangladesh welcomed Rohingya refugees. Moreover, migration to the United States brings national security risks.

1.2 Significance of the Problem

1.2.1 Two factors make Al Qaeda's support for the ARSA relevant to terrorism: Beyond a stated target of men to take up the fight, more than 688,000 Rohingya refugees are living in Bangladesh in difficult conditions, some of whom are men vulnerable to ARSA influence. Some Buddhist Rohingya play a role in crime and transnational militancy risks in a key hub on heroin trafficking routes in a western coastal area of Myanmar. With the Rohingya Crisis, the Bangladeshi state suffers an economic strain, as the Bangladeshi state spent Tk 400 core to support the Rohingya as a financial burden for the Bangladeshi state as much as it is for Rohingya in the 2018 fiscal budget of Bangladesh.

1.3 Review of the Literature

1.3.1 Despite the plethora of articles and materials covering the Rohingya issue from different angles, primary research on this topic is still scarce; the literature review's results are presented in the List of sources below.

1.3.2 Selected Literature

1.3.2.1 **Imtiaz Ahmed (2010)** stated in *The Plight of the Stateless Rohingyas* that the crisis is caused by Myanmar policies aided by making Rohingyas stateless and refugees discriminated against, tortured and persecuted.

1.3.2.2 **Azeem Ibrahim's Rohingyas – Inside Myanmar's Hidden Genocide: How the Rohingya People Have Become the Discarded Children of Myanmar; An Examination of Myanmar's History and the Rise, Fall and Rise of military rule and the Rise of Democracy, with the result of massive state-sponsored violence against the Rohingya people, fuelled by Theravada Buddhist ideology.**

1.3.2.3 **Saleemul Haque**, in *The Rohingya Refugee Crisis*, addresses the Environmental impacts of Cox's Bazar and short, mid, and long-term response strategies towards Sustainable Solutions.

1.3.2.4 **Imtiaz Ahmed** states that because of border porosity, Rohingyas are involved in trafficking (Ahmed 2010 & 2022). Statelessness and deprivation are the causes, according to Sreeparna Banerjee (2019). Arakan Army uses unemployed Rohingyas for drug smuggling, says Michael Van Ginkel (2020).

1.3.2.5 **Apurupa Bhattacharjee's Rohingyas Crisis, According to Policy Options and Analysis (2017)**, the Rohingya influx has created security issues for Bangladesh—food, water, health, and internal law and order—but there is no definitive solution.

1.3.2.6 Fiscal implications of the Rohingya crisis for Bangladesh (2018) provide by Fahmida Khatun and Md Kamruzzaman. Without repatriation, \$7 billion over five years or \$9.2 billion to resettle 300 daily over 12 years.

1.3.2.7 Iffat Idris's *Rohingya Refugee Crisis, The Age of Reference: Columbia University (2015)* charts regional tensions and political rivalries due to the crisis and the potential to radicalise people in camps without providing solutions to avoid radicalization.

1.3.3 Summary of Observations

1.3.3.1 After a detailed review of prior literature, the researcher has found that the Rohingya refugee crisis as a threat to Bangladesh's national security remains unobserved. The presence of refugees can also bring opportunities to work on a comprehensive strategy to counter the perils of Bangladesh's national security. This investigation might help us come up with a sustainable solution to this Rohingya problem.

1.4 Objective of the Research

1.4.1 Broad Objective

1.4.1.1 This research aims to examine the Rohingya refugee crisis and identify its potential impact on Bangladesh's national security.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

1.4.2.1 To critically review the Rohingya refugee crisis.

1.4.2.2 To identify the Rohingya refugee crisis's implications on Bangladesh's national security.

1.4.2.2 To recommend ways and means to counter the perils emanating from the Rohingya refugee crisis over the national security of Bangladesh.

1.5 Research Questions

1.5.1 Primary Question

1.5.1.1 How does the Rohingya refugee crisis impact Bangladesh's national security?

1.5.2 Secondary Questions

1.5.2.1 What are the different aspects of the Rohingya refugee crisis?

1.5.2.2 How is the Rohingya refugee crisis affecting Bangladesh's national security?

1.5.2.3 How to curb the Rohingya refugee crisis's detrimental impacts on Bangladesh's national security?

1.6 Analytical Framework



Figure 1.1: Analytic Framework.

1.7 Research Hypothesis

1.7.1 Rohingya refugee crisis has detrimental impacts on the national security of Bangladesh.

1.8 Research Methodology

1.8.1 Type of Research

This paper is a social explanatory research paper on international relations and security studies.

1.8.2 Variables

a. **Dependent Variables.** The research aims to identify any relationship between the Rohingya refugee crisis and Bangladesh's national security. Therefore, Bangladesh's national security is the dependent variable.

b. **Independent Variables.** The Rohingya refugee crisis.

1.8.3 Data Collection Methodology

The research is conducted using a document study, interviews, and the researcher's practical knowledge. The details are described in the following paragraphs.

- a. **Document Study.** This is a secondary data collection method.
- (1) **Analysis Type.** Qualitative analysis.
 - (2) **Sample Size.** Numerous books, documents (secondary documents), and many related internet sites.
 - (3) **Description.** This method reviews published or printed (including electronically printed) facts, figures, opinions, and observations critically and objectively. The list of the documents is given in the **Bibliography**.
- b. **Interviews.**
- (1) **Analysis Type.** Quantitative analysis.
 - (2) **Sample Size.** A number of senior military officers, professors of international relations, security analysts, and experts on the topic will be interviewed.
 - (3) **Description.** The researcher personally interviews the interviewees using a mixture of closed-ended and open-ended structured questionnaires. The collected information and opinions will be subjectively analyzed to attain the findings.
- c. **Focused Group Discussions (FGDs).** FGDs are also planned to gather the opinions of more participants. The participants will be selected based on their expertise in the subject matter.




Figure 1.2: The Pattern of Data Collection.

1.9 Research Methodology

1.9.1 Validating the Hypothesis. The problem is examined following a **Mixed-Method Study Design**. Table 1.1 shows the methods followed to confirm the hypothesis.

Ser	Corresponding Research Question	Methodology
1.	What are the different aspects of the Rohingya refugee crisis?	Content analysis, survey, interview, FGD, case study
2.	What are the ways the Rohingya refugee crisis is affecting the national security of Bangladesh?	Content analysis, survey, interview, FGD, case study
3.	How to curb the detrimental impacts of the Rohingya refugee crisis on the national security of Bangladesh?	Content analysis, survey, interview, FGD

Table 1.1: Mixed-Method Study Design
(Source: Researchers' Construct)

1.9.2 Study Design

1.9.2.1 Population. The study population consists of Bangladesh Army officers up to Lieutenant Colonel, Junior Commissioned Officers, other ranks, and the general population of Cox's Bazar. Key informant interviews were conducted with Army officers to address research questions.

1.9.2.2 Population Size Calculation. Population size has been determined following William Gemmill Cochran's Formula as given below

The formula for Sample Size for Infinite Population (S) = $z^2P(1-P)/e^2$

Here,

S= Sample size for infinite population

z= confidence level

p= population portion/standard deviation

e= margin of error

1.9.2.3 Z Score. To find the z-score, the following table has been used:

Confidence Level	z-score (±)
80%	1.28
85%	1.44
90%	1.75
95%	1.96
99%	2.58

Table 1.2: Standard Z-score for Various Confidence Levels

(Source: <https://www.calculator.net/sample-size-calculator.html?type=1&cl=95&ci=5&pp=50&ps=&x=Calculate> accessed on 31 December 2023)

1.9.2.4 Margin of Error. The error calculation is done using the following formula:

$$\text{Margin of error} = z \times \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{n}}$$

n = sample size • σ = population standard deviation • z = z-score

Figure 1.3: Formula for Calculation of Margin of Error (Source: <https://www.surveymonkey.com/mp/margin-of-error-calculation>)

Confidence Level (z) = 95% or 1.96	
Standard Deviation (σ) = 50% or 0.50	
Margin of Error (e)%	Sample Size (n)
8	151

7	196
6	267
5	385
4	601

Table 1.3: Margin of Error Calculation (Source: <https://www.calculator.net/sample-size-calculator.html?type=1&cl=95&ci=5&pp=50&ps=&x=Calculate> accessed on 31 December 2023)

1.9.2.5 Sample Size for Infinite Population

Margin of Error (e) = 5% or 0.05	
Standard Deviation (p) = 50% or 0.50	
Confidence Level (z)	Sample Size for Infinite Population (S)
80%	164
85%	208
90%	273
95%	385
99%	666

Table 1.4: Sample Size Calculation for Infinite Population
(Source: <https://www.calculator.net/sample-size-calculator.html?type=1&cl=95&ci=5&pp=50&ps=&x=Calculate> accessed on 31 December 2023)

Applying Cochran's Formula for the infinite population, the sample size is 385. However, to obtain opinions from members of different arms and services of various ranks and age groups and conduct a comprehensive study, **the study sample size will be 500.**

1.9.2.6 Data Collection Plan. The details of the samples are given below:

Ser	Data Collection Method	Sample Size	Remarks
1.	Survey	432	Group 1: Senior Officers and COs/OCs from Infantry Divisions. Group 2: Officers of the rank Major and below, Junior Commissioned Officers, and other ranks serving in the Ramu Cantonment (from different age groups).
2.	Interview-1	10	Senior Officers and COs/OCs from Infantry units
3.	Interview-2	50	Participants are the local population residing in Cox's Bazar area
4.	FGD	08	Participants are Lieutenant Colonel and below
Total		500	

Table 1.5: Breakdown of Sample Size
(Source: Researchers' Construct)

1.9.2.7 Data Collection Technique.

1.15.2.7.1 Quantitative Part. **Stratified Random and Purposive Sampling** After explaining the study objectives and procedures to the subjects, resource personnel collects quantitative data through close-ended questionnaires on Google Docs and Key-Informat Interviews (KIIs) with open-ended questions.

1.9.2.7.2 Qualitative Part. FGD is conducted in physical mode.

1.9.3 Study Sites. Officers, JCOs, OR from the Bangladesh Army, and the local population at Cox's Bazar are counted for surveys. Selected serving senior officers are contacted as resource personnel for KII.

1.9.4 Study Duration. January 2018 - April 2024.

2. HISTORICAL PREVIEW AND THE GENESIS OF THE ROHINGYA CRISIS

2.1 Who are 'Rohingyas'?


2.1.1 The Rohingya is an ethnic group of Sufi-influenced Sunni Islamic faith who predominantly resided in the northwestern region of Rakhine in Myanmar before 2017, with a global population of 3.5 million, out of which only one million Rohingya lived in Rakhine state before the Rohingya crisis which started in August 2017¹. This area is adjacent to the Naaf River, and the boundary with Bangladesh is also called the Mayu region.



Figure 2.1: Rakhine State, Myanmar.

They diverge from Myanmar's dominant Buddhist groups (predominantly Bamar, Shan, Rakhine, etc) ethnically, linguistically, and religiously². The Rohingya are one of the largest stateless populations globally and have faced many years of civil insult, displacement, and genocide in Myanmar, which has earned them recognition by the United Nations as *"the most persecuted minority in the world"*.³ The Rohingya speak 'Rohingya' or 'Ruaingga', a dialect distinct from others spoken throughout Myanmar. They are not considered one of the country's 135 official ethnic groups and have been stripped of citizenship in Myanmar since 1982, which has effectively rendered them stateless.

2.1.2 Despite a ceasefire since the late 20th century, violence in Myanmar's Rakhine State, brutality continues, and more than 880,000 Rohingya women and children among them have fled to Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh – now the largest and most congested refugee camp globally, 742,000 of them had to flee only after August 2017. The term "Rohingya" was accepted and used by the Burmese government in its peaceful democratic period from 1948 to 1962.



¹<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Rohingya>

²<https://www.cfr.org/background/rohingya-crisis> (Council on Foreign Relation)

³<https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/rohingya/>




Figure 2.2⁴: fleeing

Tentative location of Rohingyas worldwide.

2.2 Genesis of the Rohingya Crisis

2.2.1 Myanmar encompasses 676,578 sq km, including conflict-stricken Rakhine State, where the third million and sixth million, the size of the Rohingya Muslim marginalised population live. North Arakan’s Muslim leaders have sought separate status since the 1980s when exclusionary policies denied them civil liberties and Buddhist dominance.




Figure 2.3: Major Myanmar

Ethnic Groups of

2.2.2 Rakhine Buddhists joined with Japan during WWII to form the Burmese Independence Army (BIA); on the other hand, Rohingya Muslims sided with Britain’s “V Force” for a separate region. Muslims and Buddhists were already bitterly opposed to each other in Myanmar, and Japan's forces retaliated by setting 307 villages on fire, killing 100,000 Rohingyas and uprooting 80,000.⁵ The 1942 violence aggravated Muslim-Buddhist tensions, and Rakhine was under Japanese occupation up to the end of the world war⁶. Rohingya Muslims demanded inclusion into East Pakistan when Britain was leaving in 1946, and afterwards, the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation, formed during the 1980s, claimed a separate Muslim country. Ethnic concerns messed up Rakhine Buddhists’ social relations, and hence, Rakhine State became the epicentre of post-WWII violence⁷.

2.2.3. **Ideologies of Antagonism.** This ideology of antagonism, in which past violence establishes the status of any group as the other’s mutual enemy, heightens Rakhine–Rohingya antagonisms (Richard et al., 2001: 79). The

⁴<https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/4/18/who-are-the-rohingya>

⁵ ibid

⁶Sarwar J. Minar & Abdul Halim, The Rohingyas of Rakhine State: Social Evolution and History in the Light of Ethnic Nationalism

⁷Aye Chan, “The Development of a Muslim Enclave in Arakan (Rakhine) State of Burma (Myanmar)”, Kanda University of International Studies, SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 2005, ISSN 1479-8484, <https://www.soas.ac.uk/sbbr/editions/file64388.pdf> Accessed on January 05, 2022.

dynamic seen in Hutu Tutsi, Tamil-Sinhala, and the same seen in Myanmar and Bangladesh—risks further inciting violence in these places.

2.2.4 In 1982, the Myanmar military junta led by General Ne Win deprived Rohingya citizenship and ethnic minority status with a new citizenship law that did not let Rohingya be included in the 135 officially recognised ethnic groups listed in the 1974 Constitution. Since 1994, the regime of Myanmar has been trying to distribute the restricted birth certificates to Rohingya babies⁸ ⁹. In 1995, Myanmar gave the Rohingyas ‘White cards’, which means that they have certain rights but not citizenship rights in Myanmar. By 2015, all these were withdrawn, denying the Rohingyas, from census, the right to vote or even contest an election¹⁰ ¹¹.




Figure 2.4: Major Ethnic Groups of Myanmar¹²

2.3 History of Rohingya Exodus: A Malevolent Chronicle

2.3.1 The Myanmar military-led Buddhist regime has never recognised Rohingya’s presence in Myanmar, but history shows Rohingyas’ presence in the Rakhine state of present Myanmar from 700 AD. The military holds raw constitutional power and has the right to seize state control during an emergency. Since the early 1980s, each time the Myanmar authorities intensified the repression, hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas have had to flee, most in the Cox’s Bazar district in Bangladesh and other countries, where they described appalling violence at the hands of Myanmar security forces, including rape, torture, fires, and killings.

⁸<https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2013/05/03/activists-call-review-myanmar-s-citizenship-law>

⁹Persio, S.L. (2017, September 15). Why Myanmar Hates the Rohingya. Newsweek. Retrieved from <https://www.newsweek.com/why-myanmar-hates-rohingya-665883>

¹⁰<https://www.cfr.org/background/rohingya-crisis>

¹¹Persio, S.L. (2017, September 15). Why Myanmar Hates the Rohingya. Newsweek. Retrieved from <https://www.newsweek.com/why-myanmar-hates-rohingya-665883>

¹²https://www.google.com/search?q=ethnicity+in+myanmar+rakhine&sxsrf=AOaemvJSjinSRU_KboSzw3gFV5M6yyKFJQ:1641627402303&source=lnms&tbn=isch&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj5pavR0qH1AhXcT2wGHa5KC64Q_AUoAXoECAEQAw&biw=1366&bih=568&dpr=1#imgrc=ozPA7U1af9pQXM



Figure2.5: Immediate Safe Heaven for Rohingyas

A state of influx into Bangladesh from Myanmar is shown in the following table:

Serial	Year of Influx Incident	Number of Rohingyas	Remarks
1.	1978	200377	Almost all returned under a Repatriation Agreement reached between Bangladesh & Myanmar on 9th July 1978.
2.	1991-92	250877	A total of 236,599 were returned under a bilateral agreement. Myanmar unilaterally halted the process in 2005. 14,000 (now 34,000) are still living in 2 refugee camps.
3.	2009-2016	300,000	Including 87,000 that arrived after October 2016.
4.	2017	692,000	A total of 692,000 forcibly deported Rohingyas from Myanmar took shelter in Bangladesh on 25 August 2017. Inflow is continuing, though in a small number.

Table 2.1¹³: Chronicle of Rohingya Influx into Bangladesh from Myanmar.

2.4 Circumstances Leading to Recent Catastrophe in August 2017

2.4.1. Rohingya-Rakhine tensions escalated after 1962, and in 1978, Operation Dragon King sparked ethnic hatred. Thus, a synergistic cohabitation had become implausible, resulting in a widespread chain of communal clashes as appended below:

Table 2.2: Widespread Chain of Communal Clashes in Myanmar¹⁴.

Serial	Month/Year	Location	Incident	Fatality
1.	June 2012	Rakhine	The alleged rape and homicide of a young Buddhist woman sparked off the first and most deadly incident of rioting and clashes between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims.	Two hundred dead and displaced thousands.

¹³ RRRRC

¹⁴Why is there communal violence in Myanmar? BBC News, July 3, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18395788> Accessed on January 13, 2022.

2.	March 2013	Meiktila in central Myanmar	A dispute in a gold shop led to communal violence between Buddhists and Muslims.	More than 40 people died, and entire localities were demolished.
3.	August 2013	The central town of Kanbalu	Rioters after police refused to hand over a Muslim man accused of raping a Buddhist woman.	Muslim-owned houses and shops were burnt.
4.	January 2014	Rakhine State	Violence flared after accusations that Rohingyas killed a Rakhine policeman.	More than 40 Rohingya men, women and children killed
5.	June 2014	Mandalay	A rumour spread on social media that one or more Muslim men had raped a Buddhist woman.	Two people were killed, and five were hurt.

Source: Researcher’s Construct.




Figure 2.6: Satellite Image of Destroyed Rohingya Villages¹⁵

In April 2013, Human Rights Watch said that although state forces did intervene to protect fleeing Muslims, more often, they fuelled unrest by standing by and taking part in violence.¹⁶ The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, referred to the violence as “*textbook ethnic cleansing*” after Myanmar’s army and militias attacked civilians in response to the August 25 Rohingya insurgent attack¹⁷.

¹⁵https://www.google.com/search?q=ethnicity+in+myanmar+rakhine&sxsrf=AOaemvJSjinSRU_KboSzW3gFV5M6yyKFJQ:1641627402303&source=inms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj5pavR0qH1AhXcT2wGHs5KC64Q_AUoAXoECAEQAw&biw=1366&bih=568&dpr=1#imgrc=nXqv9x2e2S33PM&imgdi=sZirW_QwlrnNSM

¹⁶“Why is there communal violence in Myanmar”? BBC News, July 3, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18395788> Accessed on January 13, 2022.

¹⁷<https://www.newsweek.com/why-myanmar-hates-rohingya-665883>




Figure 2.7: Comparison of the Number of Rohingyas in Myanmar vis Bangladesh¹⁸

2.5 Repatriation Headway and Present State

2.5.1 Core Analysis of the Difficulties of Repatriation. Diplomatic efforts to secure Rohingya repatriation into Myanmar have failed seven years since the influx to Bangladesh, and my study segues with Myanmar’s background and offers comprehensive solutions for the successful repatriation of the Rohingyas.

2.5.2 Rohingya Statelessness. The official persecution of the Rohingya started in 1982 when, according to the citizenship law, they became 'stateless' because they had no ancestry before 1823, which deprived them of basic rights; a solution is not likely unless the citizenship law changes¹⁹.

¹⁸<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/28/rohingya-crisis-explained-in-maps>

¹⁹Conversation, T. (n.d.). The history of the persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya. Retrieved from <https://theconversation.com/the-history-of-the-persecution-of-myanmars-rohingya84040>

2.5.3 **The Misunderstood Roots of the Rohingya Crisis.** Myanmar sees Rohingya as terrorists, while humanitarian organisations regard Rohingya as a persecuted minority, making an end to the crisis more difficult.

2.5.4 **Geo-Politics and China, India, and the USA.** China's regional strategy includes Myanmar importing its natural gas, oil, and cargo rerouting from the Middle East to avoid the Malacca Strait and the \$18.53 billion China invested in Myanmar (2017). India, meanwhile, has invested heavily around Sittwe to gain a foothold in its northeastern states and check China's Belt and Road Initiative, with a view of Sittwe as a gateway to Southeast Asia^{20 21}. The US grand strategy appears to be aimed at distorting or delaying China-led infrastructure and maritime projects in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean region as part of the BRI²².

2.5.5 **Informed Consent of Rohingya for Safe Return to Myanmar.** Rohingya leaders declined voluntary repatriation without first getting citizenship rights or any UN consent, neglecting the fact that CFR's Joshua Kurlantzick and the UN warned that the Myanmar conditions were still deemed more threatening than Bangladesh's²³.

2.5.6 **The Role of ASEAN.** As Kurlantzick shows, the ASEAN non-interference principle, absence of collective action, and the majority of its members' refusal to ratify the UN Refugee Convention ensured minimal response to the Rohingya crisis, as none of the members could intervene directly in Myanmar's actions²⁴.

2.5.7 **Post-Military Coup in Myanmar** Rohingya would be very happy if they can return home and peacefully live there.' Myo Myint Maung, Burma Task Force on Myanmar, Rohingya repatriation efforts are halted by Myanmar's military coup on February 1, 2021, in which Aung San Suu Kyi is detained. UN action is urged by Rohingya leaders, fearing the coup is bringing them closer to extinction²⁵.

2.5.8 **Foreign Aid is a Barrier to Repatriation.** NGO workers and local elites, who profit economically, do not want successful repatriation; their living standards are higher than in Myanmar, and foreign aid is indirectly to blame for the repatriation²⁶. That is why efforts to ensure the safety of Rohingyas in Myanmar are more important than providing comfort to them in the Bangladeshi camps.

2.6 **Conclusion.**

2.6.1 Colonial migration policies and Myanmar's exclusionary 1982 citizenship law rank the Rohingya as one of the most excluded people in the world, stateless and catalysts for resentment. UN not labelling 2017 'ethnic cleansing' that forced many into Bangladesh highlights decades of discrimination and risks to regional stability in South Asia.

3. THREATS STEMMING FROM THE ROHINGYA CRISIS THREATENING THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF BANGLADESH

3.1 **Food Insecurity.**

3.1.1 The impact of the Rohingya influx on food prices in the local market is quite high. Numerous cultivable land and ponds of Ukhiya and Teknaf are merged with Rohingya camps; thus, the local food supply chain is drastically hampered. Between August 2017 and March 2018, at least 100 hectares of agricultural land in Teknaf and Ukhiya have either been occupied by Rohingya settlements or rendered useless by sandy soil flowing down from the mountain slopes²⁷. The Rohingya crisis has driven up the local food market. In contrast, local supply has

²⁰ Ahmed, K. U. (2018, October 23). The geo-politics of Rohingya crisis. The Financial Express.

²¹ ibid

²² Webb, W. (2017, September 20). Oil, Gas, Geopolitics Guide US Hand In Playing The Rohingya Crisis . MPN News

²³ Council on Foreign Relations. (2020, January 23). Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis>

²⁴ ibid

²⁵ Kamruzzaman, M. (2021, February 01). World, Asia - Pacific . Retrieved from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/future-of-rohingya-repatriation-talks-hangs-inbalance/2129774>

²⁶ Muhiuddin, K. (n.d.). DW Made for Minds. Retrieved from Foreign aid is a hindrance to Rohingya repatriation: <https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-foreign-aid-is-a-hindrance-to-rohingya-repatriation/a-5015768>

²⁷ "Impact of Rohingya Settlements: Locals face graver food insecurity", The Daily Star, April 4, 2019

declined, leading to steep price hikes, including a 36% increase in vegetable prices from 2017 to 2018²⁸. The surge of price hikes can be understood by analysing the below table²⁹.

Serial	Commodity	August, 2020	August, 2023	% increased
1.	Flour	Tk 28-30 kg	Tk 45-50 kg	63.79
2.	Soya bean Oil	Tk 100-110 ltr	Tk 170-175 ltr	64.76
3.	Onion	Tk 40-45 kg	Tk 80-95 kg	95.56
4.	Garlic	Tk 65-80 kg	Tk 220-240 kg	219.44
5.	Fish (ruhi)	Tk 250-300 kg	Tk 450-550 kg	72.72
6.	Chicken (broiler)	Tk 110-120 kg	Tk 170-180 kg	52.17
7.	Egg	Tk 35-37 four pieces	Tk 48-52 four pieces	38.89

Table 3.1: Increased Price Hike of Daily Commodities: Comparison between August 2020 and August 2023

(Source: www.tcb.org)



²⁸“Impact of Rohingya refugees on food prices in Bangladesh: evidence from a natural experiment”, World Development journal, volume 154, June 2022

²⁹“Prices of essentials rise by 34% in 3 years”, The Daily New Age, 06 September 2023

3.1.3 Since the Rohingya crisis began in 2017, local income and job opportunities have dropped, According to SMA Ullah's study, with an 11 per cent income drop between 2015 and 2020³⁰. According to the 2019 GRFC report, Cox's Bazar has become even more food insecure due to the Rohingya influx, as a 2021 BRAC survey found that employment rates and wages in the district are much lower than the national average.

3.2 Environmental Degradation.

3.2.1 According to a study, eleven environmental impacts were identified that have been aggravated by the Rohingya influx³¹. Six were physical environmental impacts on groundwater, surface water, acoustic levels, indoor air quality, solid waste management, and soils and terrain. The other five impacts were natural forests, protected areas and critical habitats, vegetation, wildlife, and marine and freshwater ecosystems.



Figure 3.1: Satellites Capture Before-And-After Images of Rohingya Influx in Cox's Bazar Area.
(Source: www.givingcompass.org)

3.2.2 Due to the concentration of Rohingya in Cox's Bazar, 3,500 acres of the total 2,092,016 acres of forest land have already been lost, amounting to a loss of 1.67 percent of the total forest area of Cox's Bazar. Meanwhile, 65,500 kg of timber, roots, and vegetation are collected daily as cooking fuel to meet the demand³². The table below shows that around 4472 million taka was lost due to deforestation for the Rohingya refugee influx.

Location	No. of refugees staying at side	Occupied Land (acres)	Destroyed project forest (acres)	Destroyed natural forest (acres)	Losses from forestation projects (Tk. million)	Losses from natural projects (Tk. million)	Total Loss (Tk. million)
Kutupalong	2,18,000	1,767.5	570.0	1197.5	508.9	1,019.1	1,528.0
Balukhali (land 2)	1,26,900	1,114.0	550.0	564.0	704.5	480.0	1,184.5
Balukhali Dhaka	63,000	310.0	152.7	157.3	136.3	13.4	149.7
TajnimarKhola	56,250	451.0	192.5	258.5	169.1	220.0	419.1

³⁰"Impact of the Rohingya Crisis: Supporting the extreme poor in Cox's Bazar", The Daily Star, June 6, 2023

³¹Report on Environmental Impact on Rohingya Influx' by UNDP and Ministry of Environment and Forests of BD government on November 2018

³²"Rohingya Issue and Financing of Human Development Research Centre" by Sajal Kumar Mondal, Daffodil International University, December 2019

Hakimpara	93,550	516.0	281.9	235.0	363.4	200.8	534.3
Shofillyakata	13,000	201.2	92.5	108.7	96.2	92.5	188.7
Kerontoli	16,020	79.8	78.8	100.0	60.5	0.9	61.3
Putibunia	30,000	88.6	0.0	88.6	0.0	75.4	75.4
Nayapara	20,100	245.0	82.0	163.0	100.0	138.7	238.7
Leda	15,000	45.0	0.0	45.0	0.0	38.3	38.3
	6,51,820	4,818.1	2000.4	2,917.6	2138.9	2,279.1	4418.00

Table 3.2: Deforestation for Rohingya refugee influx (Source: Forest Department, Cox's Bazar Sadar 2019)

Serial	Ecosystem Types	Ecosystem service value (million US\$)		Changes from 2017 to 2021	
		2017	2021	Million US\$	percentage
1.	Food production	1.91	1.71	-0.20	-10.61
2.	Raw material	3.45	2.69	-0.76	-21.97
3.	Climate regulation	3.52	2.75	-0.77	-21.97
4.	Waste treatment	5.50	5.43	-0.06	-1.18
5.	Nutrient cycling	9.02	7.04	-1.98	-21.97
6.	Erosion control	2.40	1.87	-0.53	-21.97
7.	Soil retention	0.25	0.19	-0.05	-21.97
8.	Recreation and tourism	2.85	2.62	-0.23	-8.09

Table 3.3: Estimated values for different ecosystem services functions of Ukhiya and Teknaf Upazilas from 2017 to 2021³³.

3.2.3 This influx has also significantly affected the ecosystem functions of Teknaf and Ukhiya Upazilla. The table above shows how the local area's estimated value for different ecosystem service functions has changed from 2017 to 2021.

3.3 Host Communities' Sufferings.

3.3.1 In 2017, the local population at Cox's Bazar welcomed and supported incoming Rohingya refugees. However, within a year, research began to show a major shift in the view of Bangladesh's host population³⁴. In a survey in host communities around the camps, 85 per cent of locals said that they did not feel safe with Rohingya living nearby and believed that Rohingya children should be excluded from Bangladeshi schools³⁵. The influx of almost a million Rohingya refugees in Teknaf and Ukhiya was an exceptional demographic "shock" for the host community.

3.3.2 In a survey, it is seen that 70% of local people find that their lives worsened after the Rohingya influx³⁶.

³³Navigating nature's toll: Assessing the ecological impact of the refugee crisis in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, Heliyon 9 issue (2023), www.Cell.com/heliyon

³⁴Summer of Interview -1, attach to Research paper

³⁵The Rohingya Amongst Us', Xchange, 2018

³⁶"Conflict Dynamics between Bangladesh Host Communities and Rohingya Refugees", SPECIAL REPORT, no 519, April 2023, United States institute of Peace, www.usip.org




Figure 3.2: Rohingya Effect on Quality of life (Source: Special report, issue 519, April 2023)

3.3.3 Frustrations among the local host communities have led to demands for Rohingya removal from Cox’s Bazar; 68% of the locals surveyed believe Rohingya should be sent back immediately, while 27% want them to stay in Bangladesh and leave for Myanmar when the situation there is suitable for their safe return³⁷.




Figure 3.3: Opinion of Bangladeshis on Rohingya’s Reside (Source: Special report, issue 519, April 2023)

3.4 Tarnished Labour Market.

3.4.1 Rohingyas flood the labour market with more numbers and gradually are pushing the locals out: increasing numbers of locals protest; they say that Rohingyas take all the jobs, that local employers prefer them as day labourers, paying 200 – 300 taka versus 600 taka for local workers³⁸. The table below shows how rapidly the wage of daily labour in Cox’s Bazar is reducing after the Rohingya influx³⁹.

³⁷ ibid

³⁸“Hosts fume as Rohingya start grabbing local labour market”, The Daily Prothom Alo, 31 July 2021

³⁹“From solidarity to resistance: host communities” evolving response to the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh by Anas Ansar and Abu Faisal Md. Khaled, July 2021, www.researchgate.net

Serial	Professions	No of respondents	Teknaf (monthly income in taka)		Ukhiya (monthly income in taka)		Cox's Bazar Town (monthly income in taka)	
			Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
1.	Local small traders	38	15000	10000	14000	8500	17000	17000
2.	Farmer	33	12000	7500	12000	6000	15000	13000
3.	Fishing sector worker	34	8700	6000	8300	5300	11000	8000
4.	NGO/Private job	38	10000	40000	10000	43000	12000	40000

Table 3.4: Average monthly income (in BDT) of the respondents before and after the refugee arrival in 2017


3.4.2 A study by the Policy Research Institute in 2019 showed that the wage rate for labourers before the influx was BDT 417 per day in Teknaf, which fell to Tk 357 – marking a 14.3 per cent decline. In Ukhiya, it fell to 6.08 per cent⁴⁰. Several protests and human chain activities are going on to stop the Rohingya labourer's infiltration into the local market⁴¹.

3.4.3 Several Rohingya are engaged in different establishments, e.g., construction, health, NGO, and informal areas. Nevertheless, NGOs employ 8,000, and 20,000 are involved in other local occupations. If the Rohingya labourers infiltrate the job market like this, huge unrest may cast over in Cox's Bazar⁴².

3.5 Spread of Epidemics.

3.5.1 The Cox's Bazar healthcare system has been overwhelmed by the influx of Rohingyas, resulting in increased waterborne diseases, malnutrition and putting reproductive care under strain. Many hospitals give priority to the treatment of refugees, frustrating host communities. From 2019 to 2021, local demand soared for healthcare providers further straining scarce resources⁴³.

Figure 3.4: Percentage of Seeking Medical Treatment by Rohingya and Host Communities (2019, 2020, 2021).



⁴⁰“From solidarity to resistance: host communities evolving response to the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh” by Anas Ansar and Abu Faisal Md. Khaled, July 2021, www.researchgate.net

⁴¹“Human chain in Cox's Bazar to prevent Rohingya infiltration in labour market”, The Daily Bangladesh Post, 30 January 2022

⁴²Summer of Interview -2, attach to Research paper

⁴³Joint Multi-Sector Needs Assessment: Rohingya Refugees (2019, 2020, 2021); Joint Multi-Sector Needs Assessment: Host (2019, 2020, 2021)

3.5.2 In the overcrowded and poor sanitation system of Rohingya camps, providing hygienic food and pure water is a challenging task for the authorities. In a study, it was found that the number of latrines in Rohingya camps is 1:29 to 1:43⁴⁴. Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar rely on unsafe, flood-prone water sources, making them vulnerable to cholera and typhoid (31% of the 720,499 people of concern, as per UNHCR).



3.5.3 Communicable diseases, including scabies, which had spiked in overcrowded, popular, unhygienic camps and limited water supply, cases of skin diseases doubled to 73,000 in 2021 and went further in 2022⁴⁵. Sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS are reported to be on the rise in Cox’s Bazar with rape cases, particularly involving Rohingya refugee women and girls, increasing the local women and girls’ vulnerability to sex trafficking; up to now, 61 Rohingyas, 57 locals have been reported dead from AIDS, while cases around camp areas persist^{46 47}.




Figure 3.6: Numbers of HIV-affected persons in Cox’s Bazar area from 2019 to 2022

⁴⁴“The Rohingya Refugee Crisis: Environmental and Health Concerns for Bangladesh”, by Md. Saddam Hossain, Saudi Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 14 June 2022

⁴⁵Unprecedented increase of scabies cases in Cox’s Bazar refugee camps, Medecins Sans Frontieres, project update 25 March 2022

⁴⁶AIDS increasing among Rohingya population in Cox's Bazar, The Business Standard, 29 July 2022

⁴⁷ ibid

3.6 The Culpability of Exotic Armed Group Sheltering/ Harboring of Foreign Agents.

3.6.1 Anytime, Rohingya refugees can be targeted by several criminal gangs and extreme groups⁴⁸. “Every night, we hear gunshots,” a Rohingya refugee said to Human Rights Watch. Various groups are responsible for these types of attacks, namely the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), Islami Mahaz, the Munna gang, and several others. The Bangladesh Ministry of Defence stated that at least 11 armed groups are influencing the Rohingya camps⁴⁹. Their common targets are activists, majhis, and educated people. At least 16 majhis were killed in the first half of 2023⁵⁰.

3.6.2 Bangladesh’s primary security concern is the presence of ARSA, an extremist insurgent group from Myanmar advocating violent resistance to reclaim Rakhine. Myanmar has been declared Jihad by extremist groups who are calling on Bangladesh to cut ties with Myanmar and may exploit southeastern Bangladesh’s diverse population to stoke communal violence while posing a major threat to Bangladesh’s national security^{51 52}. The report, published in February 2023, identified Tambru’s Konapara Camp, close to the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, as an ARSA hub for operations, training, drug smuggling and terrorist activities among Ukhia, Balukhali, Palangkhali and Whykong⁵³.



Figure 3.7: Security forces have increased security after the killing of Rohingya community leader MohibUllah in the Kutupalong Refugee camp, Bangladesh, October 2021 (Source: 2021 Munir Uz Zaman/AFP via Getty Images).

The Figure 3.8 denotes scattered refugee camps in the South and Southeast of BD⁵⁴. Therefore, it is quite convenient for the armed groups ruling over Rohingya camps to shelter and harbour terrorists and foreign agents posing severe national security threats.

⁴⁸Bangladesh: Spiraling violence against Rohingya refugees, Human right Watch, 13 July 2023

⁴⁹“11 active armed groups in Rohingya camps”, The Daily ProthomAlo, 27 feb 2023

⁵⁰ ibid

⁵¹“Indefinite Hosting of Rohingya Refugees a Growing Concern for Bangladesh”, Sharma, Indrajit. The Diplomat, 09 July 2021

⁵²“Myanmar/Bangladesh: A Humanitarian Calamity and a Two-country Crisis,” International Crisis Group, January 31, 2018

⁵³“Bangladesh-Myanmar: Expanding Menace Of ARSA – Analysis”, by Afsara Shaheen, Eurasia review, 04 July 2023

⁵⁴NGO Connectivity Needs in the Rohingya Refugee Crisis Response, September 2020, USAID Cooperative Agreement #AID-CIO-A-10-00001




Figure 3.8: Location of Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar area. (Source: www.nethope.com)




Figure 3.9: Crimes involved by ARSA and other terrorist groups in Rohingya camps and Cox’s Bazar from 2017 to 2022 (Source: Confidential and not to be quoted; collected from Intelligence agency and law enforcement agency)

The figure shows the high tendency rate of crimes involved by the ARSA and other terrorist groups. Here, crimes denote killing, abduction, gunfight, rape, dacoity, and other violence.

3.7 Drugs Trafficking

3.7.1 Drug trafficking is one of the most significant securitised threats to the state and society in Bangladesh through the complex nexus between Bangladeshi organised crime syndicates and armed actors in Rohingya refugee camps^{55, 56}. Some armed groups operating in the Rohingya camps source their funding from the drug trade and use the cash generated from the same to hire operatives with refugee youths.

3.7.2 Drugs, especially Yaba, have mostly entered Bangladesh from Myanmar via Teknaf.⁵⁷ Yaba is obtained from Rakhine state and transported in congested Rohingya camps in Ukhiya for onward distribution in Cox Bazar⁵⁸. The picture below shows drug smuggling routes from Myanmar to Bangladesh through refugee camps.

⁵⁵“Drug trade threatens our security”, The daily Observer, 11 November 2023

⁵⁶ ibid

⁵⁷“Why Bangladesh's Yaba Drug Epidemic Continues to Fester” by Vaishali Basu Sharma, the Wire, 25 January 2021

⁵⁸ ibid



Figure 3.10: Members of the Border Guard Bangladesh on 16 February 2023 arrested a Rohingya drug dealer along with 1 lakh Yaba tablets from Ukhiya border of Cox's Bazar. (Source: TBS report/Bangladesh)



Figure 3.11: Yaba smuggling route from Myanmar to Bangladesh via Rohingya camps (Source: Tarek Mahmud/Dhaka Tribune)

3.7.3 Illicit drug trade is thus inflowing Bangladeshi security. According to a report published in 2022, 7 lakh Bangladeshi youths take Yaba daily and spend around BDT 210 crore on it^{59 60}. From 2019 to 2022, the state of recovery of drugs and arrested persons by law enforcement agencies from Cox's Bazar is shown below:

Serial	Years	Yaba		Remarks
		Amount (pieces)	Arrested (person)	
1.	2019	31,04,442	253	
2.	2020	43,23,981	304	

⁵⁹“Rohingyas are not yaba consumers, they’re carriers: Home Minister”, The Daily Star, 20 July 2022

⁶⁰ ibid

3.	2021	68,25,439	393	
4.	2022	69,34,096	491	

Table 3.5: State of recovery of drugs and arrested person by law enforcement agency from Cox's Bazar from 2019 to 2022 (Source: Confidential and not to be quoted; collected from Intelligence agency and law enforcement agency)

3.8 Human Trafficking

3.8.1 The swift humanitarian response to the Rohingya crisis has saved many lives, but the overall situation is still fragile as the refugees remain extremely vulnerable socially, economically, and environmentally⁶¹. The deteriorating condition largely stems from the refugee camps due to a lack of employment opportunities lined with rising numbers of violence (including sexual and gender-based). From March 2019 to March 2020, more than 15,000 refugee trafficking incidents were recorded – with actual numbers likely to be much higher⁶². The human trafficking of Rohingyas peaks in the winter season when the sea is calmer.



Figure 3.12: Rohingyas are a major target for human trafficking in this region (Source: The daily ShampratikDeshkal, 14 August 2023)

3.8.2 In addition, the counter-trafficking experts of the UN Migration Agency, IOM, have warned of serious human trafficking incidents by Rohingya refugees⁶³. The Rohingya refugee camps are full of jobless young people desperate to get out. It is a fertile ground for traffickers. They give refugees hope for a better life in India, Thailand, or Malaysia. However, refugees generally fall into the trap and are forced to work. There have been many reports of women and girls being forced into prostitution. As a spillover effect, Bangladeshi citizens are also being allured to join these fleeing Rohingyas, expecting a better livelihood abroad.

3.8.3 The most shocking security breaching is that many of the Rohingya refugees have managed to collect the National Identity Document (NID) cards of Bangladesh⁶⁴. By utilizing the NID card, the Rohingyas are getting national benefits⁶⁵. According to the UN High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), since January 2020, more than 2,300 Rohingyas – many of them women and children – have crossed the Bay of Bengal⁶⁶. The UNHCR

⁶¹“Present and Future Paradigms in Human Trafficking”, by Mokbul Ahmed and Robaiya Nusrat, Chapter 3, Human Trafficking and Crimes in the Rohingya Refugee Camps in Bangladesh, May 2022, IGI Publisher

⁶²“Human traffickers prey on Rohingya refugees”, by NazmunNaherShishir, The Third Pole, 2 February, 2021

⁶³“Thousands at Risk of Trafficking amid Rohingya Refugee Crisis: IOM”, news/global 31 July 2018

⁶⁴“Factors behind Human Trafficking in Host and Rohingya Communities in Cox's Bazar : An Overview”, by Jishu Barua, Social Change, ISSN : 1997 - 938X Vol. 10, No. 1, 2021

⁶⁵ ibid

⁶⁶“Human traffickers prey on Rohingya refugees”, by NazmunNaherShishir, The Third Pole, 2 February, 2021

reported that some 3,545 Rohingya made or attempted the crossing of the Bay of Bengal⁶⁷. The majority of refugees have left from camps near Cox's Bazar. Bangladesh Police on 17 January 2023 detained 750 Rohingyas from Cox's Bazar while trying to flee to Dhaka from refugee camps illegally⁶⁸. They were sent back to the transit camps. However, many refugees succeeded in settling in different parts of Bangladesh, thus making national security vulnerable⁶⁹.



Figure 3.13: Rohingya refugee trafficking route map.
(Source: The Third Pole)

3.9 Arms Trafficking.

3.9.1 Since the mid-1990s, arms trafficking has been reported in Cox's Bazar. Numbers of displaced Rohingya also participate in illicit arms trades due to the shortage of alternative livelihood opportunities⁷⁰. Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) in November 2021 held three Rohingyas from a clandestine gun-making factory in Cox's Bazar's Kutupalong Rohingya camp⁷¹.

⁶⁷"Surging crime, bleak future push Rohingya in Bangladesh to risk lives at sea", The Daily Prothom Alo, 24 January 2023

⁶⁸"750 Dhaka-bound Rohingyas detained in Cox's Bazar, sent back to transit camp", The daily Business Standard, 18 January 2023

⁶⁹ ibid

⁷⁰"Arms Trafficking Through Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh", by Sarah Gutberlet, 15 January 2020 www.stableseas.org

⁷¹"Gun factory in Rohingya camp: 3 held with 10 guns", The Daily Sun, 08 November 2021



Figure 3.14: Gun factory in Rohingya Camp (Source: The Daily Sun/08 November 2021)

3.9.3 The influx of illegal firearms and ammunition through Cox’s Bazar poses a serious national security threat. In November 2021, Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) unit arrested four individuals with five firearms and 301 rounds of bullets, including bullets for an AK-47 rifle, from Dhaka's Jatrabari area. One of these four arrested is Md Hossain, a Rohingya arms dealer who smuggled illegal arms and ammunition from India and Myanmar and sold them to criminal groups in Dhaka, Chattagram and Cox's Bazar^{72 73}.




Figure 3.15: Recovered arms, ammunition and arrested Rohingyas by the security forces in Cox’s Bazar (Source: Confidential and not to be quoted; collected from Intelligence agency and law enforcement agency)

The figure above shows how the number of arms and ammunition recovered by law enforcement agencies has increased in recent years.

3.10 Goods Smuggling.

⁷² ibid
⁷³ ibid

3.10.1 Another notable security threat along the Bangladesh-Myanmar Border is goods smuggling⁷⁴. Many Burmese products are quite popular and cheap in Bangladeshi markets. Therefore, the demand for various Burmese products is increasing among local people⁷⁵.

3.10.2 According to the Coast Guard, the Bangladesh-Myanmar border is used by smugglers to transact goods⁷⁶. They bring the products by boat, crossing the Naf River. Many Chinese, Thai, and Burmese products are entering the Bangladeshi market without tax invoices through this route, which causes the Bangladesh government a huge tax loss⁷⁷.

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Figure 3.16: Numbers of Rohingyas are involved in good and drug trafficking (Source: SorinFurcoi/Al Jazeera)

3.11 Radicalization.

3.11.1 Norwegian Ambassador in Dhaka Sidsel Bleken has mentioned that the refugee camps in Cox's Bazar have turned into a breeding ground of radicalisation due to the absence of proper education and employment opportunities for the displaced people⁷⁸. Refugee children are restricted from local schools by the government and provide preschools by NGOs, but madrasas only fill this educational gap inadequately⁷⁹. Some of the madrasas are operated by radical groups and do not teach these children Arabic to be understood or critically studied but rather through studying it by rote. These schools have proliferated to the alarm of activists and experts. Activists and experts are alarmed by the proliferation of these schools. Shahriyar Kabir, a Bangladeshi journalist, says the camps are home to 39 militant groups⁸⁰.

⁷⁴"A Critical Study on the Transnational Organized Crime along the Bangladesh-Myanmar Border" by Md. Harun-Or-Rashid, AkkasAhamed, Md. SayedurRahman, 2020. International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR) (2020) Volume 52, No 2, pp 203-216

⁷⁵"I carry yaba to survive: Rohingya and Bangladesh's meth trade", by LinahAlsaafin, 19 August 2018

⁷⁶"A Critical Study on the Transnational Organized Crime along the Bangladesh-Myanmar Border" by Md. Harun-Or-Rashid, AkkasAhamed, Md. SayedurRahman, 2020. International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR) (2020) Volume 52, No 2, pp 203-216

⁷⁷ ibid

⁷⁸"Rohingya camps turned breeding ground for radicalization", The Daily Star, 5 July 2018

⁷⁹"Extremism growing among Rohingya children in Cox's Bazar camps", by SumonCorraya. The Asia News, 24 July 2019

⁸⁰ibid



Figure 3.17: Rohingya children are learning the Quran in the camp's madrasa (Source: google search/Deposit photos)

3.12 Likelihood of Separatist Movement.

3.12.1 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh remain stranded six years later. Fear is running high among Cox's Bazar locals, who say they're desperate for the refugees living with them and over 186 killings linked to separatist groups that have entered the business of drugs, kidnapping, smuggling and extortion. Ukha's Shahin Mia says it's a threat to our safety⁸¹.

3.12.2 Cox's Bazar Citizens' Rights Movement Member Secretary HM Nazrul Islam said the people of the entire area are under constant threat due to the Rohingyas⁸². 'We want a Rohingya-free Cox's Bazar,' said Hnila Union Parishad Chairman Rashed Mahmud Ali, who warned of rising tensions. Now a minority among 1.2 million Rohingyas, local Muslims in the state living in mostly poverty also fear separatist groups may spark conflict, including attempts to seize control of territory with groups such as the Kuki Chin National Front (KNF).

3.13 Pressure on Budget/ Economy.

3.13.1 With limited resources and a large number of Rohingya refugees, Bangladesh's economy has struggled because of the high birth rate. While these conditions pose hardships, Bangladesh, with the help of international donors, still feeds, houses, treats in health centres, teaches in schools and inoculates against COVID-19, doing everything it can to make refugees safe and comfortable^{83 84}. Major impacts are named in the below figure.

3.13.2 Since 2017, the Joint Response Plan has raised more than \$2.43 billion raised to manage Rohingya refugee funds⁸⁵. However, contributions have declined, with 44.5 per cent in 2022 as opposed to 72.9 per cent in 2021, putting further strain on Bangladesh, whose plight has faded into the background globally⁸⁶. International aid to the Rohingya is forecast to continue declining in the coming years.

⁸¹"Separatist groups behind escalating violence in Rohingya camps", by Abdur Rahman, The Dhaka Tribune, 25 August 2023

⁸² ibid

⁸³"Bangladesh spends \$1.22 bn a year for 1.2 mn Rohingyas: PM", The Daily Star, 22 September 2022

⁸⁴"Adverse Economic Impact by Rohingya Refugees on Bangladesh: Some Way Forwards", by Syed Magfur Ahmed and Nasruzzaman Naeem, 2020, International Journal of Social, Political and Economic Research

⁸⁵"Rohingya crisis: The Picture of Fund Crisis and its Impact", Sothern Social Movement Newswire, 16 January 2023, www.cetri.be

⁸⁶"Bangladesh spends \$1.22 bn a year for 1.2 mn Rohingyas: PM", The Daily Star, 22 September 2022



Figure 3.18: Economic Impact of Rohingya Crisis (Source: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3698176>)

The statistics below show how the funds are decreasing.

Serial	Year	Requirement (million US dollar)	Funded (million US dollar)	Funding Shortfall
1.	2017 (Sep – Feb 18)	\$434.1M	\$317M	27%
2.	2018 (Mar 18 - Dec)	\$951M	\$655M	31%
3.	2019	\$920M	\$699M	24%
4.	2020	\$1058M	\$629M	40.5%
5.	2021	\$943M	\$678.5M	28.1%
6.	2022	\$881M	\$433.1M	50.8%

Table 3.6: Rohingya management fund under JRP (2017-2022) (Source: Sothern Social Movements Newswire)

3.13.3 The government of Bangladesh has spent \$350 million to develop Bhasan Char to accommodate 100,000 Rohingyas and \$1.22 billion every year on refugee care. Budget constraints are severe, with biodiversity loss and a poorer Cox's Bazar following declining international funding^{87 88}. In addition to the direct economic burden, Bangladesh has to spend a lot of human resources required to manage the Rohingya crisis⁸⁹.

3.14 Imposed Foreign Intervention.

3.14.1. The UN and States with considerable influence, as well as INGOs, offer the Rohingyas crucial humanitarian aid and human rights support on the grounds of recognising them as refugees in Bangladesh. But Bangladesh does not recognise them as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention, calling them instead

⁸⁷ ibid

⁸⁸ Questionnaire and Summary of FGD-2.f, attach to Research paper

⁸⁹ ibid

'Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Citizens'^{90 91}. According to a survey, 73.8% of people opined that the role of humanitarian organisations and NGOs in supporting Bangladesh in managing the Rohingya refugee crisis and its security implications should be assessed⁹².

3.14.2 There are 189 NGOs working in Rohingya camps, with 55 international ones. Allegations of suspicious activities, the use of funds and delaying the safe return of Rohingyas back to Myanmar ensued against some INGOs since 2017^{93 94}. There are allegations that some extreme groups are indirectly providing huge sums of money and weapons to the Rohingyas to conduct illegal and anti-national actions such as drug trafficking, lawbreaking, and smuggling⁹⁵. In 2019, the Bangladesh government banned 41 INGOs/NGOs from working in Rohingya camps in Cox's Bazar for influencing Rohingyas to break the camp's rules and regulations.⁹⁶



Figure 3.19: UNHCR chief Filippo Grandi visited the Rohingya camp in Bangladesh.(Source: UNHCR/Kamrul Hasan)

3.15 Conclusion.

3.15.1 The security challenges posed by the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh, involving trafficking, radicalization, cross-border violence and environmental degradation, is the challenge at hand.

4. POSSIBLE LINKAGE BETWEEN ROHINGYA CRISIS, INSURGENCY, AND TERRORISM AND THEIR SPILLOVER EFFECTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY OF BANGLADESH

4.1 Rohingya Militancy Spawning Insurgency and Terrorism

4.1 With decades of persecution ingrained into some, a tendency to use violence and crime in the Rohingya is thus apparent, and they formed armed groups such as Mujahedeen, Rohingya Liberation Party, ARSA and others. They arose to protect the Rohingya cause, to resist military oppression, and to shield the Rohingya from Myanmar's state-sponsored persecution⁹⁷.

⁹⁰ "Are some NGOs working against Rohingya repatriation?", The daily Observer, 18 June 2023

⁹¹ ibid

⁹² Survey Result, answer of question 10, attach to Research Paper.

⁹³ ibid

⁹⁴ "Bangladesh withdrew 41 NGOs from Rohingya camps for malpractices", www.bdnews.com, 31 August 2019

⁹⁵ "Are some NGOs working against Rohingya repatriation?" The daily Observer, 18 June 2023

⁹⁶ "Bangladesh withdrew 41 NGOs from Rohingya camps for malpractices", www.bdnews.com, 31 August 2019

⁹⁷ "Rohingya insurgency in Western Myanmar, Discussion in 'Central & South Asia' started by dray", February 5, 2017 <https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/rohingya-insurgency-in-western-myanmar.476308/>, Accessed on February 27, 2018.

4.2 Mujahideen uprisings

4.2 In the 1940s, the Rohingyas rose against state oppression with the 'Mujahideen Movement' from its inception during Myanmar's independence. This struggle transformed into armed rebellion or insurgency due to continued discrimination as time passed⁹⁸. According to Israeli historian Moshe Yegar, the Mujahideen insurgency can be traced back to post-independence Rohingya oppression in Myanmar⁹⁹. The declaration of Buddhism as Myanmar's state religion in 1961 led to Mujahideen uprisings in Rakhine¹⁰⁰ ¹⁰¹. The government made an all-out effort to transmigrate Buddhists from the rest of the parts of Myanmar to Rakhine State to reduce the Rohingya Muslim majority¹⁰².

The Surge of Crime in the Rohingya Camps Forecasts Linkage to Terrorism

4.3 Psychological Alignment.

4.3.1 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are also psychologically scarred by years of oppression, but by war, that has become normal. A 2018 DRL-funded survey documented atrocities against 1,024 refugees in Rakhine State¹⁰³. Among surveyed refugees, 82% saw loved ones killed, 45% witnessed rape and 20% gang rape. It was brutal violence; many reported seeing children thrown into fires onto bayonets¹⁰⁴. The result of all this growing frustration and uncertainty among the jobless Rohingya people, particularly the youth, lures them to get involved in internal disputes, armed clashes, dacoity, terrorism, and numerous anti-social criminal activities.



Figure 4.1: Percentage of Rohingyas Witnessed Persecution (Source: Researcher's construct based on Police Record)

⁹⁸"Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State", *International Crisis Group*, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state>, Accessed on December 15, 2021.

⁹⁹"Muslims of Burma" by Moshe Yegar.1972.pp. 98–101.

¹⁰⁰ *ibid*

¹⁰¹"Ethnic Conflict and the 2010 Elections in Burma", by Marie Lall, 23 November 2009. Chatham House.

¹⁰²"State Terrorism in Arakan" in *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia* (edited by: Andrew Tan), by Syed, Serajul Islam (2007). Cheltenham Glos, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. p. 328. ISBN 184542543X, 9781845425432 Check isbn= value (help). Retrieved 6 November 2021.

¹⁰³"Documentation of atrocities in northern Rakhine State", US Department of State, Bureau Of Democracy, Human Rights, And Labor, September 24, 2018, <https://2017-2021.state.gov/reportsbureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/documentation-of-atrocities-in-northern-rakhine-state/index.html>

¹⁰⁴ *ibid*

4.4 **Crime Pattern in the Rohingya Refugee Camps.**

4.4.1 A Bangladesh Defense Ministry report released on February 15, 2023, announced that the security situation in Cox’s Bazar Rohingya camps had reached an alarming level due to the operations of 10 terrorist and criminal gangs – ARSA and RSO among them. The resulting 32 murders last year alone came from frequent clashes for dominance among groups¹⁰⁵. Last year, police arrested 2,531 Rohingya, up from 2021, when 1,628 were arrested with 666 cases. Murder, drug trade and human trafficking soared. Internal lethal crime among refugees is a disconcerting tendency to violent crime.

4.4.2 The involvement of millions of refugees in Cox’s Bazar has slowed the district’s security since August 2017. Between 2017 and 2022, 2,659 cases were also filed against 5,880 Rohingya criminals, who brought instability and threatened the host community and tourists. 82.2% believe that Bangladesh has shifted.¹⁰⁶




Figure 4.2: No. of Cases Filed vis-a-vis Convicted Criminals 2017 to 2022. (Source: Researcher’s construct based on Police Record)




Figure 4.3: No. Cases Filed vis-a-vis Types of Crime 2017 to 2022. (Source: Researcher’s construct based on Police Record)

¹⁰⁵ Tighten Security at the Rohingya Camps, The Daily Star, 16 February 2023, Dhaka, <https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/editorial/news/tighten-security-the-rohingya-camps-3249686>

¹⁰⁶Survey Result, answer of question 7, attach to Research Paper.

The statistics show an increase in Rohingya-linked crime close to armed factions, with serious terrorism concerns locally and further afield.

4.5 Possible Linkage to Transnational Terrorism and Impacts on Global Security

4.5.1 Myanmar has declared ARSA a terrorist group, and if it attracts Rohingya refugees, it may link up with global terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and IS-Khorasan. Such influence is vulnerable to the oppressed Rohingya with no security and hope. ARSA denies the allegations, but evidence seems to suggest its links to regional and international terror groups.

4.5.2 ARSA denies links to any global terrorist group, but Al Qaeda has backed the Rohingya cause. Abu Syed al-Ansari and Khaled Batarfi urged Muslims in Bangladesh, India and Indonesia to wage jihad in support of Rohingya Muslims in 2017¹⁰⁷. Ansar Ghazwatul Hind, which links Al-Qaeda, called for 'Muslims to retaliate against Buddhists' by defending Rohingya Muslims.¹⁰⁸

4.5.3 There is also historical evidence of Al-Qaeda focusing interest on the Rohingya issue during the 1980s and 1990s¹⁰⁹. According to Human Rights Watch, the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), which might have ties to Al-Qaeda, was also trying to form a coalition, "Rabitatul Mujahedeen"¹¹⁰. Ata-Ullah, who was born in Pakistan, allegedly trained with the Taliban after fleeing Saudi Arabia in 2012¹¹¹. These developments could bring ARSA nearer to Al-Qaeda and ISIS associates, who are able to expand these groups in South Asia with the assistance of the Rohingya refugees turn out to be.

4.6 The Culpability of Exotic Armed Group Sheltering/ Harboring of Foreign Agents.

4.6.1 Criminal gangs and Islamist armed groups can target Rohingya refugees¹¹². Night gunfire makes Rohingya refugees cower in fear of their lives amid escalating violence. The camps house multiple armed groups, including RSO, Islami Mahaz, ARSA, and the Munna gang, among others, according to Bangladesh's Ministry of Defence, which named at least 11 factions¹¹³.

4.6.2 This presence of ARSA in Bangladesh is a security threat, for it wants the Rakhine through violence. Other extremists have called on Bangladesh to cut ties with Myanmar, and other outside powers will pressure it to stop the deportation¹¹⁴. These Islamist groups also projected a number of processions, mass demonstrations, and protests near the refugee camps on various issues¹¹⁵. The extremist groups' rogue intentions and heinous interests may lead to a national security crisis at any moment¹¹⁶.

¹⁰⁷ "Yemeni al Qaeda leader calls for attacks in support of Myanmar's Rohingya", Reuters, Dubai, September 2, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-alqaeda/yemeni-al-qaeda-leader-calls-for-attacks-in-support-of-myanmars-rohingya-idUSKCN1BD0U8> Accessed on on March 03, 2023.

¹⁰⁸ "Al-Qaeda calls on followers to support Rohingyas", Dhaka Tribune, September 13, 2017, <http://www.dhakatribune.com/world/south-asia/2017/09/13/al-qaeda-rohingya-crisis/> Accessed on March 03, 2023

¹⁰⁹ Zachary Abuza, "Myanmar's Tatmadaw and the Making of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army", Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 21, November 10, 2017, <https://jamestown.org/program/myanmarstatmadaw-making-arakan-rohingya-salvation-army/>, Accessed on March 03, 2023

¹¹⁰ Pepe Escobar, "Jihad: 'The ultimate thermonuclear bomb'", Asia Times, Islamabad, October 10, 2001, <https://asiatimes.com/2001/10/jihad-the-ultimate-thermonuclear-bomb/>, Accessed on March 4, 2023.

¹¹¹ "Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State", International Crisis Group, Yangon/Brussels, 15 December 2016, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-musliminsurgency-rakhine-state>, Accessed on March 04, 2023

¹¹² Bangladesh: Spiraling violence against Rohingyarefugee, Human right Watch, 13 July 2023

¹¹³ 11 active armed groups in Rohingya camps, The Daily ProthomAlo, 27 feb 2023

¹¹⁴ Sharma, Indrajit. "Indefinite Hosting of Rohingya Refugees a Growing Concern for Bangladesh." The Diplomat, 09 July 2021

¹¹⁵ ibid

¹¹⁶ Myanmar/Bangladesh: A Humanitarian Calamity and a Two-country Crisis," International Crisis Group, January 31, 2018




Figure 4.5: Location of Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar area (Source: www.nethope.com)

The above picture denotes scattered refugee camps in the South and Southeast of BD.

4.6.3 The security threat from ARSA in Bangladesh has risen, and so have the Cox’s Bazar Rohingya camps become even more vulnerable. ARSA has operated and trained from Tambru’s Konapara Camp, which was formerly known for limited patrolling¹¹⁷. From that point, they also control drug smuggling and terrorist activities. The report also stated that ARSA is active in Ukhiya, Balukhali, Palangkhal (Ukhiya Sub-District) and Whykong (Teknaf Sub-District) of Bangladesh. The figure below shows the high tendency rate of crimes involved by the ARSA and other terrorist groups. Here, crimes denote killing, abduction, gunfight, rape, dacoity, and other violence.




Figure 4.6: Crimes involved by ARSA and other terrorist groups in Rohingya camps and Cox’s Bazar from 2017 to 2022 (Source: Confidential and not to be quoted; collected from Intelligence agency and law enforcement agency)

¹¹⁷Bangladesh-Myanmar: Expanding Menace Of ARSA – Analysis, by Afsara Shaheen, Eurasia review, 04 July 2023

4.7 Likelihood of Separatist Movement.

4.7.1 It has been six years since Rohingya refugees took shelter in Bangladesh, and they are still stranded amid the complexities of geopolitics. Local residents of Cox's Bazar stated that refugees are becoming desperate day by day. So far, more than 186 killings have occurred in the refugee camps, which can be linked to the illegal activities of different separatist groups¹¹⁸. As the days go by, these groups are becoming more frightening. Shahin Mia, a local of Ukhiya, said, "Since the Rohingya crisis, the business of drugs, kidnapping, smuggling, and extortion has increased. The safety of our lives is at risk."

4.7.2 Cox's Bazar Citizens' Rights Movement Member Secretary HM Nazrul Islam said the people of the entire area are under constant threat due to the Rohingyas¹¹⁹. "We want a Rohingya-free Cox's Bazar. They are openly committing murders and using weapons against locals. If the Rohingyas do not return [to Myanmar], it is possible that one day the locals might have to leave the area," Hnila Union Parishad Chairman Rashed Mahmud Ali said. He also added, "The local of Teknaf and Ukhiya live in great fear because of Rohingyas. In the presence of 1.2 million Rohingyas, the locals have become a minority¹²⁰."

Conclusion

4.8 As stateless and desperate Rohingyas, decades of struggle have worked to carve their psychology into a ready platform for protest violence. Rohingya armed groups, motivated by a desire to stop oppression and create an autonomous Arakan state, constitute a serious security danger to Bangladesh through insurgency and transnational terrorism.

5. IMPACT OF ROHINGYA REFUGEE CRISIS ON THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY OF BANGLADESH

5.1 Understanding National Security.

5.1.1 National security is more than a nation's military defences to defend citizens, businesses and institutions; it encompasses terrorism prevention, crime reduction, economic stability, energy and food security, environmental protection, and cyber defences. In addition, it also provides security to non-state actors like business corporations against organized crime and natural disasters.



Figure 5.1: Understanding the overall goal of national security¹²¹.

¹¹⁸Separatist groups behind escalating violence in Rohingya camps, by Abdur Rahman, The Dhaka Tribune, 25 August 2023

¹¹⁹ ibid

¹²⁰ ibid

¹²¹https://www.nsed.gov.hk/national_security/index.php?l=en&a=national_security_overview

5.1.2 Previously, national security was purely military based but now it has become non militarism facets. Lippmann explained that security is having nations uphold their interests without fear of war¹²². For Charles Maier, national security was the capacity to steer domestic and foreign conditions necessary for a community's independence, prosperity, and well-being¹²³. Prabhakaran Paleri defines national security as a nation's capability to neutralise multidimensional threats to the well-being and survival of its people, maintain balanced state policies, and embrace global security¹²⁴. According to a survey, 84% of people opined that the influx of Rohingya refugees poses a threat to the national security of Bangladesh¹²⁵.

5.2 Elements of National Security.

5.2.1 National security includes economic, energy, physical, environmental, food/border, and cyber security, coincident with national power elements. Although states are increasingly shifting toward nonmilitary approaches to dealing with security challenges and systemic concerns, coercive power, including military resources, is still considered the core of handling security problems and systemic problems¹²⁶. Today, military capabilities include air, space, cyber, and psychological operations, as well as land and sea. Military capabilities designed for these domains may be used for national security or equally for offensive purposes, such as conquering and annexing territory and resources.




Figure 5.2: Elements of National Security
(Source: Author's own compilation)

5.2.2 **Military Security.** A nation's military's ability to defend its security, deter its aggression, or enforce its policies by means of military force is called military security. In the military, the term military security is often used interchangeably with security. Fourth-generation wars with non-state actors now fall under military security, which centers on managing physical threats via military capability¹²⁷. National security frequently entails the

¹²²Romm, Joseph J. (1993). *Defining national security: the nonmilitary aspects*. Pew Project on America's Task in a Changed World (Pew Project Series). Council on Foreign Relations. p. 122. ISBN 978-0-87609-135-7

¹²³MAIER, CHARLES S. *Peace and security for the 1990s*. Unpublished paper for the MacArthur Fellowship Program, Social Science Research Council, 12 Jun 1990. As quoted in Romm 1993, p.5

¹²⁴Paleri, Prabhakaran (2008). *National Security: Imperatives And Challenges*. New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill. p. 521. ISBN 978-0-07-065686-4

¹²⁵Survey Result, answer of question 2, attach to Research Paper.

¹²⁶Ammerdown Group (2016). "Rethinking Security: A discussion paper" (PDF). rethinkingsecurity.org.uk.

¹²⁷US, White House (2015). "National Security Strategy" (PDF). Archived from [the original](#) (PDF) on 2016-10-06.

readiness of military forces to protect borders and counterterrorism. The US, UK, and France prioritise power projection, while the others prefer territorial defence¹²⁸.

5.2.3 Infrastructural Security. Infrastructure security protects critical systems from sabotage, terrorism, and contamination to reduce vulnerabilities and maintain stability to critical national services¹²⁹. Agencies to protect critical infrastructure exists in all governments, such as the key point installations protection services, which protects infrastructure crucial for economic stability and service continuity. Some of the threats to infrastructure include Terrorism, Sabotage Information Warfare, and Natural Disasters.

5.2.4 Political Security. Barry Buzan and colleagues argue that political stability and international equity are essential to national security. Political security depends on international law, functional institutions, diplomacy, and the political inclusion of marginalised people to uphold and foster citizen well-being¹³⁰.

5.2.5 Economic Security. National defense and stability largely depend on economic security, robust economies underwrite and strong security frameworks. Conversely, countries with weaker economies experience insecurity, especially through high unemployment and economic fear, and weaken the nations' resilience and stability.

5.2.6 Environmental Security Ecosystem integrity is a condition for the existence of our lives, and environmental security serves as the means to ensure it. With increasing human-induced ecological damage, it's becoming more essential. Economic and national security impacts include topsoil erosion, deforestation, biodiversity loss, and climate change—all of which could lead to migration. Agriculture-dependent developing economies are risk-prone, and although ecological threats to security remain a controversial global issue, all world security networks, factual and imagined, should act as their security system¹³¹.

5.2.7 Energy and National Resources. Water, energy, land and minerals are natural resources essential for national development and economic power. National strategies are about resource security, and partly, the 1991 Gulf War was driven by the desire to secure oil. These interconnections are recognised, and resource security is now listed as a UN Sustainable Development Goal, with the US putting solar microgrids up on military bases to provide energy security in outages¹³².

5.3 **National Security in Bangladesh Perspective.**

The National Committee on Security Affairs (NCSA), was born in March 2019. It was established based on the National Defence Policy-2018. In a survey, 74.1% of respondents questioned Bangladesh's handling of Rohingya security impacts¹³³ by the national committee Known as the 27-member National Committee on Security Affairs (NCSA). This security adviser committee was responsible for comprehending security issues in Bangladesh and suggesting national and foreign threats to the cabinet. According to a survey, 77.1 per cent believe the Rohingya crisis has specific security challenges¹³⁴.

5.4 **Impact of the Rohingya Refugee Crisis on the Elements of National Security**

5.4.1 Several studies have been conducted on the security impacts refugees may have on their host countries. Research has shown that refugees destabilise host countries by becoming bases for political activists to organise and recruit insurgents. Host countries can also be vehicles of spillover violence if those arriving bring weapons or militant ideologies with them or even harbour fighters masquerading as refugees¹³⁵. Local group's tensions can be heightened by refugees, and conflict or instability can be caused. While primarily refugees for resettlement are

¹²⁸ Wikipedia, "National Security,"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security#cite_ref12,14,16,17,18

¹²⁹"TSA | Who We Are". Archived from [the original](#) on 2008-12-16.

¹³⁰United Nations. "UN Trust Fund for Human Security". www.un.org. Retrieved 2024-02-10.

¹³¹Romm, Joseph J. (1993). *Defining national security: the nonmilitary aspects*. Pew Project on America's Task in a Changed World (Pew Project Series). Council on Foreign Relations. p. 122. ISBN 978-0-87609-135-7.

¹³²Prehoda, et al. 2017. [U.S. Strategic Solar Photovoltaic-Powered Microgrid Deployment for Enhanced National Security](#). *Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews* **78**, 167–175. doi:10.1016/j.rser.2017.04.094

¹³³Survey Result, answer of question 4, attach to Research Paper.

¹³⁴Survey Result, answer of question 3, attach to Research Paper.

¹³⁵IdeanSalehyan. 2008 "The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of International Conflict" *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 52, No. 4 (Oct., 2008), pp. 787-801, Published By: Midwest Political Science Association.

safe in their countries of resettlement, prolonged refugee crises can engender local or regional security problems, such as terrorism concerns for resettlement nations¹³⁶.

5.4.2 Impact on Military Element. Allegedly, ARSA killed Mr Mohibullah, the chief of the Rohingya Solidarity Group, on 29 September 2021 in a camp inside BD¹³⁷. In 2019, an unprecedented attack by a terrorist group using modern weapons and IEDs on a Bangladesh army patrol in Chittagong Hill Tracts led to the deterioration of security in the country's Chittagong Hill Tracts¹³⁸.

5.4.2.1 Increased Border Security Operations.

5.4.2.1.1 Deployment of Additional Troops: Since 2019, the Bangladesh Army and Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) have added 10,000 BGB personnel in Cox's Bazar and surrounding areas to increase border security.

5.4.2.1.2 Surveillance and Patrols: UAV patrolling and the doubling of normal patrol ranges along the 271 km Myanmar border have been added to enhance surveillance¹³⁹.

5.4.2.2 Operational Strain on Military Resources

5.4.2.2.1 Resource Allocation: Bangladesh spends about \$ 250 million yearly on border and refugee camp security¹⁴⁰.

5.4.2.2.2 Budgetary Implications: The committee budgeted another \$50 million for Rohingya operations for the 2018-2019 defence budget.

5.4.2.3 Training and Readiness.

5.4.2.3.1 Shift in Training Focus. Approximately 30% of the training time in Military training programs is dedicated to these non-combat roles¹⁴¹. Programs include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations

5.4.2.3.2 Engagement in Non-Traditional Roles. Over 5,000 military personnel regularly engage in non-traditional roles such as building shelters, distributing aid, and maintaining camp infrastructure.

5.4.2.4 Increased Risk of Insurgency and Radicalization.

5.4.2.4.1 Insurgency Threats: In 2018–20, intel reports show this and weapons and explosives intercepted at the border resulted in over 100 arrests.

5.4.2.4.2 Radicalization: Intelligence personnel at camps up 20% in response to growing risks of radicalisation among refugees.

5.4.2.5 Cross-Border Tensions.

5.4.2.5.1 Diplomatic and Military Relations. Between 2017 and 2020, at least 15 reported cross-border firing incidents were reported between Myanmar and Bangladesh.

5.4.2.5.2 Joint Exercises and Collaborations. Bangladesh has engaged in joint border patrols with neighbouring countries like India. In 2019, joint exercises with BSF focused on managing refugee influx and cross-border terrorism.

5.4.2.6 Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Capabilities.

¹³⁶ Miller, Sarah Deardorff, *Assessing the Impacts of Hosting Refugees*, World Refugee Council Research Paper No. 4 — August 2018, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Canada, <https://www.cigionline.org/>

¹³⁷ *ibid*

¹³⁸ Nahid Khan, "Necessity of Restructuring Infantry Battalions to Face Hybrid Threats," (Paper, Defense Services Command and Staff College, 2021), 15.

¹³⁹ Summer of Interview -4, attach to Research paper

¹⁴⁰ Multi Sector Needs Assessment: Cox's Bazar, Rohingya Refugee Response – June 2019. <https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/3903>

¹⁴¹ *ibid*

5.4.2.6.1 **Expansion of HADR Operations.** In 2018 Bangladesh Armed Forces alone constructed over 50,000 shelters and installed hundreds of sanitation facilities within the camps.

5.4.2.6.2 **Coordination with International Agencies.** In 2019, coordinated efforts between military and international organisations ensured the delivery of over 100,000 metric tons of aid supplies to the camps.

5.4.3 **Impact on Infrastructural Element** Here's an elaboration on how the influx of Rohingya refugees has affected Bangladesh's infrastructural aspect of national security.

5.4.3.1 **Pressure on Existing Infrastructure:** By 2019, infrastructure strain in Cox's Bazar, brought on by the influx of more than 860,000 Rohingya refugees, has deteriorated roads, water supply, sanitation, and healthcare facilities in what's one of the most crowded regions in the world.

5.4.3.2 **Pressure on Road Transport:** Road conditions have worsened, infrastructure has been damaged, and increased traffic has generated congestion. The UNDP survey found that 66.7 percent of households surveyed in Teknaf and 70.41 percent in Ukhiya blame the Rohingya influx for road degradation and increased congestion¹⁴².

5.4.3.3 **Pressure on Existing Healthcare System.** Refugee needs overwhelm health services in Cox's Bazar, skew resources and reduce residents' access to health care. Safety concerns prevent girls from school and drop out of school for income support. This matters, especially for women, after rising infrastructure security worries¹⁴³.

5.4.4 **Impact on Energy and National Resources Element.** In Teknaf and Ukhiya of Cox's Bazar, refugee activities between August 2017 and March 2018 impacted on 100 hectares of cropland¹⁴⁴. By December 2017, 5,731 tube wells had been installed for water, and 5,000 acres had become unusable due to soil erosion on slopes serving as refugee houses.¹⁴⁵ This excessive reliance on groundwater lowers the area's water levels (Figure 5.3). The water levels around the camp areas have lowered by 5 to 9 meters. Freshwater resources are scarce in the afflicted areas, particularly in Teknaf (Cox's Bazar).




Figure 5.3: Falling water levels in Ukhiya and Teknaf (meter)¹⁴⁶

Fishing employs roughly one-third of the people of Teknaf¹⁴⁷. Since August 2017, the Naf River has been banished for fishing, impacting 30,000 – 35,000 fishermen and their families¹⁴⁸. According to UNDP analysis and government officials, fishing communities along the Naf River are among the hardest hit by the refugee crisis.

5.4.5 **Impact on Political Element** the Rohingya issue has impacted the country's domestic politics. Some corrupt Bangladeshi local politicians have used refugees for their political interests by providing them with illegal documents, such as Bangladeshi birth certificates and national identity cards in transaction of money that raised the security concern more.

¹⁴²<https://hdr.undp.org/content/statistical-update-2018>

¹⁴³<https://hdr.undp.org/content/statistical-update-2018>

¹⁴⁴<https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-rohingya-crisis-and-its-impact-on-bangladesh-myanmar-relations>

¹⁴⁵<https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/iscg-situation-report-rohingya-refugee-crisis-cox-s-bazar-25-march-2018>

¹⁴⁶ ibid

¹⁴⁷https://bbs.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/bbs.portal.gov.bd/page/a1d32f13_8553_44f1_92e6_8ff80a4ff82e/Bangladesh%20%20Statistics-2018.pdf

¹⁴⁸<https://www.dailymessenger.net/country/news/8864>

5.4.5.1 **Humanitarian Diplomacy.** Bangladesh's humanitarian diplomacy has received international support and praise. It has hosted diplomatic visits and conferences to alert and mobilise assistance for Rohingya refugees.

5.4.5.2 **Security Implications.** Bangladesh's security considerations are heightened by the Rohingya crisis, which has propelled reinforced border measures against illegal cross-border movements, transnational crime and the potential of radicalization.



Figure 5.4: Rohingya refugees are illegally crossing the border from camps¹⁴⁹.

5.4.5.3 **International Relations.** The Rohingya crisis has impacted Bangladesh's relations with Myanmar and some Western countries. About 80.1% think international cooperation is necessary in order to solve security issues.¹⁵⁰ Rohingyas, who are illegally integrated, have also entered local politics¹⁵¹. Rohingya representatives bolster refugees' spread, causing demographic imbalance, political tensions, negative stereotypes, and hostility locally.

5.4.6 **Impact on Economic Element.**

The Rohingya economy is driven by international aid, remittances, and wages, which reduce some of its costs, benefiting local markets. In UNDP's 2018 survey, resource losses are considered to have a \$2.70 economic impact per aid dollar, for a total of \$2.3 billion.¹⁵² The immediate host community is the loser, even if the rest of Bangladesh is generating static gains in the short term. The following paragraphs discuss details.

5.4.6.1 **Resource Strain and Infrastructure Pressure.** Bangladesh's resources have been heavily stretched by the Rohingya crisis, especially in Cox's Bazar, where more than one million refugees have fled. Land, water, and health care have become necessary to demand, pushing infrastructure to its limits. That's why World Bank data shows overcrowded camps and scarce access to clean water and sanitation for refugees and host communities.

5.4.6.2 **Labor Market Dynamics and Wage Depression.** ILO research indicates that locally unemployed persons migrating to Cox's Bazar displaced local labour markets and reduced the wages of informal workers. Faster wage decline worsens poverty, income inequality and job competition, which exacerbate socio-economic tension and impede the efforts towards sustainable development of the region.¹⁵³

5.4.6.3 **Education System Strain and Access Challenges.** It is described that Education in Bangladeshi campuses is under pressure due to the Rohingya crisis because the classrooms and resources are overloaded. About 400,000

¹⁴⁹<https://bipss.org.bd/rohingya-refugee-crisis-in-bangladesh-a-security-perspective/>

¹⁵⁰Survey Result, answer of question 9, attach to Research Paper.

¹⁵¹Mortoza, G. (2017). Rohingya representatives in Bangladesh Local Government (in Bengali). *Bangla Tribune*, 13 September

¹⁵²<https://hdr.undp.org/content/statistical-update-2018>

¹⁵³Questionnaire and Summary of FGD-2. a, attach to Research paper

refugee children do not have the right, relevant, safe, quality education, which affects refugee and local learners, reinforcing poverty and hindering socio-economic growth in the region.¹⁵⁴

5.4.6.4 **Healthcare Costs and Humanitarian Aid Dependency.** Bangladesh's strained healthcare system includes additional costs and dependence on aid because of the influx of Rohingya. Poor living conditions in camps worsen health problems and overload facilities. Consistent delivery of sustainable healthcare solutions must be provided to refugees and host communities, as reduced aid dependency is needed.

5.4.7 **Impact on Environmental Elements.** The refugee influx has wiped out 4,818 acres of Cox's Bazar forests worth \$55 million, with 750,000 kg of the forests cut down for fuel every day.¹⁵⁵ An extra 10,000 tons of solid waste a month threatens wildlife and strains waste management as the refugee influx enters its sixth year. Rainwater carries pollutants to shared water sources as a direct result of human waste contaminating 86 per cent of wells, spreading infections.

5.5 **Impact of Present Conflict between Myanmar Army and Arakan Army on the Rohingya Repatriation Process**

5.5.1 **Safety Issue.** Since October 2023, Operation 1027 in the Myanmar-Arakan Army conflict has heavily impeded the Rohingya repatriation efforts.¹⁵⁶ Myanmar Army lost some important garrisons and check posts during this operation¹⁵⁷. The Rohingya repatriation stalled by rising violence, diplomatic breakdowns, and refugee fears is disrupted by the Myanmar-Arakan Army conflict. A survey finds that 75.2 per cent of respondents endorse measures to secure safe, voluntary repatriation while addressing security concerns.¹⁵⁸

5.5.2 **Distrust and Breakdown of Diplomatic Efforts.** Conflict in the Myanmar-Arakan Army disrupts diplomatic efforts with Bangladesh to move ahead with Rohingya repatriation. By focusing on military operations, Myanmar threatens to undermine agreements and delay their new ways of forcing the refugees to return safely.

5.5.3 **Humanitarian Crisis and Displacement.** Conflict deepens a humanitarian crisis in Rakhine, forcing more people from their homes and the overpopulation of resources, which complicates and prolongs the safe organisation of Rohingya's repatriation.

5.5.4 **Impact on International Perceptions and Support.** This conflict weakens the international community's trust in Myanmar's credible process, which slashes the funding and diplomatic pressure needed for the Rohingya's return, which protracts their living in Bangladeshi refugee camps.

5.5.5 **Fear of Renewed Persecution and Instability.** Myanmar and Arakan Army clashes Displaced Rohingya: recall of past persecution and current conditions influence fresh waves of Flight. Immigrants constantly worry about relapsing to unrest or being forced again into fleeing after trying to settle in the homeland.

5.6 **Conclusion**

5.6.1 The prolonged Rohingya issue affects the Bangladeshi society economically, politically and socially for a long time. If no action is taken in the direction of repatriation, conflicts may arise with the perceived host community; thus, a business might trigger regional insecurity plus aggravated resource worries.

¹⁵⁴Summer of Interview -3, attach to Research paper

¹⁵⁵<https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/iscg-situation-report-rohingya-refugee-crisis-cox-s-bazar-25-march-2018>

¹⁵⁶<https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/myanmar-operation-1027-11102023122533.html>

¹⁵⁷<https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/myanmar-junta-loses-bases-scores-of-troops-in-four-days-of-resistance-attacks.html>

¹⁵⁸Survey Result, answer of question 14, attach to Research Paper

6. SUGGESTED WAYS FORWARD TO THE ROHINGYA CRISIS IMPACT ON BANGLADESH

6.1 Repatriation, not aid, is the only sustainable response to the Rohingya crisis, they say, emphasising that it must be ensured that Rohingyas return home safely. Bangladesh has taken a peaceful stance on the issue.¹⁵⁹

6.2 In the 72nd UN General Assembly, five-point Rohingya resolution was proposed from Bangladesh on 21 September 2017.¹⁶⁰ These are:

- 6.2.1 Rakhine State has to be freed forever of violence and ethnic cleansing unconditionally by Myanmar.
- 6.2.2 A Fact-Finding Mission by UN Secretary-General to be sent to Myanmar.
- 6.2.3 Protect all civilians and establish United Nations-supervised 'safe zones' in Myanmar.
- 6.2.4 Ensure a sustainable return of all forcibly displaced Rohingyas in Bangladesh to their homes in Myanmar.
- 6.2.5 Kofi Annan Commission recommendations to be fully implemented immediately.

Bangladesh's Way Forward to Maintain Desired Security Situation

6.3 Either Bangladesh should negotiate with key actors to resettle Rohingya or put pressure on Myanmar for their safe return. The strategic integration of national power aims for 2030 desired outcomes, but alternative pathways should be projected in the event that efforts fail.

6.4 **Diplomacy is the Strongest Tool.** Historical analysis suggested that the diplomatic attempts solved most of the previous refugee crises in the world. For example, the Greco-Turkish case was solved through diplomatic negotiations¹⁶¹. The Syrian refugee crisis could be mitigated by politically accepting refugees from multiple countries.¹⁶² Furthermore, the Sudanese government brought significant political reforms to create conducive return conditions for refugees fleeing.¹⁶³ The UN must be involved with acts of diplomacy, various IOs and key actors to implement a solution that ensures the safe return of Rohingya.

6.5 **Involving UN.** Genocide conventions mandate prevention and response to the persecution of the Rohingya, whom the US has now recognised as genocide.¹⁶⁴ The preventive measures include actions before the atrocity involving the after-action steps.¹⁶⁵ Since preventive diplomacy frequently desists in countries where state-sponsored genocide is prevalent, Bangladesh should be the one to urge the UN to take responsive action, combining both coercive and non-coercive measures.¹⁶⁶ Some essential non-coercive steps include mediation, negotiation, UNSC resolution, fact-finding missions, commissions of inquiry, and observer missions.¹⁶⁷ If non-coercive UN-initiated measures can increase global awareness and force the implementation of action plans in order to prevent further violence and persecution.

6.6 **Involving Regional Power.** India, Japan and China are powerful and influential in the region and should help tackle the Rohingya problem. Bangladesh's diplomacy with these nations is strong, so it should pursue them in peaceful talks. Since China's strategic attitude, Bangladesh may promise support by reassuring China to stick to auspicious bilateral and economic ties. One notable thing is that China is Bangladesh's largest trading partner, with \$1.159 billion in FDI in 2019 compared to other South Asian countries. The government should pursue China to elevate the relationship to a "strategic cooperation partnership"¹⁶⁸. Being the strategic country situated between the two countries, Bangladesh has good connections with both the countries that may ease Bangladesh in resolving the Rohingya crisis.

¹⁵⁹"5-point proposal could resolve Rohingya crisis: PM", The Daily Star. October 16, 2017

¹⁶⁰ "5-point proposal could help resolve Rohingya crisis: PM ", Tritiyomatra, October 17, 2017
<https://tritiyomatra.com/news/19314/local/2017/10/5point-proposal-could-help-resolve-rohingya-crisis-pm>

¹⁶¹ "What is the EU-Turkey deal?" International Rescue Committee.<https://www.rescue.org/eu/article/what-eu-turkey-deal>

¹⁶²https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions

¹⁶³<https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/sudan-in-crisis-improving-the-response-for-sudanese-refugees-in-egypt/>

¹⁶⁴ Strauss. 2016. "Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention", p 133.

¹⁶⁵ Strauss. 2016. "Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention", p 133.

¹⁶⁶Ibid, p 144.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

6.7 **Involving Powerful Actors (US, EU, G8 Nations).** The negotiation of powerful actor Britain solved the Greco-Turkish case.¹⁶⁹ So Bangladesh should try influential actors such as the US, which condemned Myanmar's genocide of the Rohingya, to find a lasting solution.¹⁷⁰ Bangladesh must use US and ASEAN support along with defence cooperation with France to pressure Myanmar to begin the repatriation of Rohingya.¹⁷¹ Myanmar's close relationship with Bangladesh, the UK, and the EU can be used by Bangladesh to put pressure on Myanmar. Sanctions, ban on travel, forcing the ICJ verdict, and Annan's report to repatriate the Rohingyas can be parts of diplomatic efforts.¹⁷² BD must convince the US and other allies of MN's geostrategic importance in maintaining freedom of navigation and a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific Region.

6.8 **Involving the Regional and International Organizations.** As a post-Darfur genocide effort on which post-genocide Sudanese resettlement was ensured by the UN, AU, MSF, UNHCR, World Bank, and IMF, Bangladesh should involve various organisations, in particular IOs, regional bodies in support of Rohingya repatriation.¹⁷³ UNHCR reports mention that MN has the solution to the crisis, and IOs can support MN to create necessary rehabilitation, reintegration, and employment opportunities¹⁷⁴. BD should seek the support of ASEAN countries, primarily Indonesia and Malaysia, to pressure MN through the regional forum. In addition, BD can also assist IOs by providing relevant data and statistics for fact-finding¹⁷⁵.

6.9 **Improving Bilateral Relationship.** Greece and Turkey fought four significant wars with each other. Still, the relationship improved with the event of "earth-quake diplomacy" through equal support and extended humanitarian assistance¹⁷⁶. Similarly, BD and MN's relationship can improve, and the two countries can settle Rohingya issues peacefully. Some experts suggested that BD and MN can develop a bilateral relationship if BD exports energy (electricity), trains human resources and develops skills, opens the education sector, and provides agricultural and medical support.¹⁷⁷ Also, BD and MN should work on establishing road and rail connectivity, which would physically and figuratively lessen the distance between the nations.¹⁷⁸ Most importantly, BD may offer MN expertise on industrialisation and extend maritime cooperation. BD can assist MN in developing its garment production fishery sector and facilitating other microcredit economic aspects.¹⁷⁹

6.10 **Mobilisation of Rohingya Leaders.** The Arakan Rohingya National Alliance (ARNA), a unified Rohingya political platform seeking to voice Rohingya self-determination and rights, was founded on 20 November 2022 by the global Rohingya community.¹⁸⁰ Concerned leaders concluded that a strong and credible platform on Rohingya issues was needed to play a stronger role globally and work with partners in Myanmar and globally for durable solutions.

6.11 **Media Campaign.** The latest Russian-Ukraine war indicates that strong information campaigns could significantly influence the outcome of a situation. Similarly, a single picture of Aylan Kurdi shook the world, resulting in the extension of humanitarian relief to Syria. Bangladesh should simultaneously use a dual approach of highlighting the conditions of Rohingya camps to gain global support and expose human rights abuses by Myanmar to bring international pressure. The strategy could be deployed to mobilise aid and produce consensus surrounding repatriation.

¹⁶⁹ "What is the EU-Turkey deal?" International Rescue Committee. <https://www.rescue.org/eu/article/what-eu-turkey-deal>

¹⁷⁰ Antony J. Blinken, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken on the Genocide and Crimes against Humanity in Burma," (Remarks at the Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, March 21, 2022), U.S. Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-the-united-states-holocaust-memorial-museum/>.

¹⁷¹ "US rules Myanmar's military committed genocide against Rohingya," Reuters, 24, March 21, 2022, <https://www.france24.com/en/asiapacific/20220321-us-rules-myanmar-military-committed-genocide-against-rohingya>.

¹⁷² Straus, 2016. "Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention", p 144.

¹⁷³ <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-darfur-crisis-tests-global-pledge-prevent-genocide>.

¹⁷⁴ "Rohingya Crisis needs lasting solutions," United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, August 21, 2020, <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2020/8/5f3e60124/unhcr-rohingya-crisis-needs-lasting-solutions.html/>.

¹⁷⁵ Questionnaire and Summary of FGD-2.e, attach to Research paper

¹⁷⁶ Niels Kadritzke, "Forgetting a Remembered History: Greece's Earthquake Diplomacy," *Le Monde diplomatique*, June 2000, <https://mondediplo.com/2000/06/06greece>.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 15-18.

¹⁷⁸ Uddin, "Prospects for Attaining a New Height in Bangladesh Myanmar Relations," 15-23.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ <https://thearna.org/arakan-rohingya-national-alliance-announced/>

6.12 **Confidence Building Measures (CBM)** According to the United Nations, CBMs are planned procedures to prevent hostilities, avert escalation, reduce military tension, and build mutual trust between countries.¹⁸¹ Confidence-building measures (CBMs) are measures taken to promote transparency, limit actions such as military build-up and demilitarization, and reduce suspicions of misinterpretations (miscalculations). The hotlines would allow the military in Bangladesh and Myanmar to prevent conflict and ease tensions.¹⁸² Both countries should take all possible CBMs, such as collaboration on counterterrorism, joint military exercises, high-level policy dialogue, continuous communication at all tiers, and measures as mentioned above.

6.13 **Economic Instrument.** Economic influence can be DUE in Bangladesh to RELIEVE the tensions and work for the ROHINGYA repatriation if Bangladesh provides the use of technology and will work on the vocational training programs in Bangladesh. Bangladesh's economic interdependence with Myanmar from 2018 to 2019 is evident from imports worth \$90.91 million and exports worth \$25.11 million.¹⁸³ Both retrieving the Rohingya crisis amicably is pivotal for a quick economic recovery from solving the Rohingya crisis is a condition for improved Bangladesh-Myanmar relations; it allows for increased FDI and cooperation through BIMSTEC and SAARC corridors. Similarly, BD can utilise MN connectivity to connect to ASEAN countries.¹⁸⁴ Both countries can develop maritime, air, and land connectivity to widen their economic opportunities.¹⁸⁵ Bangladesh could support Myanmar's Blue Economy through maritime cooperation, maintenance of energy development, and access to fisheries, agrotechnology, and industry products. The GOB may also encourage BD's renowned business groups to increase their exports and imports of goods with MN counterparts.

6.14 **Sensible Military Operations.** Bangladesh's military should conduct selective counter-terrorism operations, forces in Ramu should be reinforced, and borders should be secured to allow safe Rohingya repatriation while avoiding things like those recently seen in Lebanon's Syrian refugee situation.¹⁸⁶ There is always the danger that some military action will negatively affect the process of repatriation or even lead to many civilian deaths. Bangladesh's military should conduct selective operations against terrorism, increase forces at Ramu for Operation Preventive Strikes, and safeguard borders, waters, and airspace. DOTMLPF-P requires these actions to support the safe repatriation of personnel and counter-extremism.

Options in Case of Varying Repatriation Scenarios

6.15 Bangladesh also needs to periodically push the Myanmar government and other stakeholders through diplomatic, economic, and security methods and diplomacy through national interest, human rights, and international opinion perspectives.

6.15.1 **Naturalisation.** While a temporary solution, Bangladesh's Rohingya integration law complicates security as Myanmar's conflict with the Arakan Army impedes repatriation.¹⁸⁷ Myanmar prefers the Rohingya to remain abroad, worsening Bangladesh's security and socio-economic challenges.¹⁸⁸

6.15.2 **Slow/Very Slow Rate of Repatriation.** With population growth, the UNDP suggests that Rohingya repatriation would take a full five years if executed at 300 per day or 2 to 5 years more.¹⁸⁹ Slow progress will help escalate conflicts and get international support from Bangladesh.

6.15.3 **Repatriation within a Short period.** This is the most desired course of action for the Rohingyas, Bangladesh, and almost all of the international community, though difficult to implement with a very remote

¹⁸¹<https://disarmament.unoda.org/biological-weapons/confidence-building-measures/>

¹⁸²Chowdhury, MdNayeemAhfaque, "Bangladesh Myanmar Relation Amidst Rohingya Crisis: An Evaluation through Regional Security Complex Theory" p 194.

¹⁸³Pathik Hasan, "Strengthening Myanmar-Bangladesh Trade and economic ties," Modern Ghana, March 16, 2022, <https://www.modernghana.com/news/1145452/strengthening-myanmar-bangladesh-trade-and-economi.html>.

¹⁸⁴ Hasan, "Strengthening Myanmar-Bangladesh Trade and economic ties."

<https://caribbeannewsglobal.com/strengthening-myanmar-bangladesh-trade-and-economic-ties/>

¹⁸⁵ShazzadHussain, "Bangladesh-Myanmar Economic Opportunities: Problems and Prospects," South Asia Journal, August 19, 2021, <http://southasiajournal.net/bangladesh-myanmar-economic-ties-problems-and-prospects/>.

¹⁸⁶ "10 Facts about the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan," World Food Program USA.

<https://www.wfpusa.org/articles/10-facts-about-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-in-jordan/>

¹⁸⁷Chowdhury, MdNayeemAhfaque, "Bangladesh Myanmar Relation Amidst Rohingya Crisis: An Evaluation through Regional Security Complex Theory" p 189.

¹⁸⁸Chowdhury, MdNayeemAhfaque, "Bangladesh Myanmar Relation Amidst Rohingya Crisis: An Evaluation through Regional Security Complex Theory" p 219.

¹⁸⁹Chowdhury, MdNayeemAhfaque, "Bangladesh Myanmar Relation Amidst Rohingya Crisis: An Evaluation through Regional Security Complex Theory" p 220.

chance. The quickest repatriation of Rohingyas is also the best possible solution for Myanmar should they desire to be on the course of development and prosperity¹⁹⁰This will ease the process of social integration, lessen the separatist movement, and keep the country captive to one or two countries. It will also open up economic, strategic, and political emancipation and pave the way to emerge from the pariah or dystopian country format.

Conclusions

6.17 The Rohingya crisis needs global intervention and long-term solutions such as repatriation, justice as well as education of Rohingya. To uphold human dignity, find peace and cooperate with international actors, Myanmar and Bangladesh are essential.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Conclusion.

7.1.1 State-backed violence in Myanmar has ignited the Rohingya crisis, which has imposed tremendous socio-economic and environmental pressures on Cox's Bazar, most forcefully upon its districts of Teknaf and Ukhiya. Refugees' continued presence disturbs local prices, wages and health conditions and requires added services and protection. With no repatriation rights after 40 years of being in Bangladesh, we need stronger UN pressure on Myanmar for Rohingya to be repatriated.

7.1.2 The increase in Rohingya immigration into Bangladesh has added new security threats in the domain of extremism, criminality, and economic and ecological pressure on the state from groups like ARSA, which may shift to militancy. The situation of camps also exacerbates frictions; the Burmese government's- non-cooperation policy and recent coup destroy the repatriation perspective.

7.2 Recommendations.

7.2.1 The BD government should urgently address the security situation in the camps through enhanced coordination, investigation, and accountability among Bangladeshi law enforcement. Investigation and apprehension of armed actors in the camps must be improved through enhanced coordination among Bangladeshi law enforcement inside and outside of the camps and through authorisation of Armed Police Battalion officers in the camps to directly receive reports from Rohingya and carry out investigations in the camps.

7.2.2 The BD government could do much to enhance protection within camps by enhancing safe house arrangements and involving the community. Camp officials should engage the Rohingya; instead of using armed guards at night, the refugees can be enrolled in night security or something to that effect. For the vulnerable people, there should be houses outside the camp.

7.2.3 UN agencies must support Rohingya governance locally and internationally by increasing the pilot projects of the Rohingya camp leaders' election and invitations to global platforms such as the Global Refugee Forum.

7.2.4 The BD government should have to provide a long-term Rohingya policy to the UN rather than talk with UNHCR & Myanmar and get an agreement for relocation.

7.2.5 Negotiate with the Arakan Army to provide security and conduct raids to create ways for the proper repatriation of Rohingya.

7.2.6 Run skill development programmes in the camps so that refugees are empowered to take up productive activities more in the future, boosting Myanmar's economy.

¹⁹⁰Chowdhury, MdNayeemAhfaque, "Bangladesh Myanmar Relation Amidst Rohingya Crisis: An Evaluation through Regional Security Complex Theory" p 221.

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