

Vedanta Perception of Purva Mīmāṃsā: A Classical Indian Philosophy

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Abstract

The origin of Advaita Vedānta is the oldest Upanishads, and the main sites of this tradition are strengthened by Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtra. Sūtra Brahma consolidated. Ādi Śaṅkara, who systematized the work of earlier thinkers, in the 8th century was, but not the first, the leading exponent of the Advaita Vedānta interpretation. As all Indian philosophies, Advaita Vedānta evolved in varied religious and philosophical scenery in relation to other traditions of India, such as Jainism and Buddhism. Different traditions and texts of Hindu philosophy have inspired and have shaped its history, such as Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, the other replacement Vedānta, Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, Purāṇas, Āgamas and social movements as well as Bhakti movement. Advaita Vedānta is one of Indian classical thought's most learned and influential schools. Advaita Vedānta has become widely accepted in Indian culture, and beyond, as a paradigmatic example of Hindu spirituality in modern times, because of developments in medieval times with the Hindu reactions to Muslim rule and established in colonial times by neo-Vedāntines and Hindu nationalists. Many scientists describe this as monism, others as non-dualism. The texts of Advaita Vedānta support a variety of views including idealism, illusionism and the rational or almost rational perspectives articulated in Śaṅkara's early works. Jaimini was known as the Purva Mīmāṃsā or Mīmāṃsā method. As a Vedic Indian method, Mīmāṃsā stresses greatly the proper comprehension of the Vedic language to ensure that rituals can be properly conducted. The word 'Mīmāṃsā' comes from the root man with the -san switch. The theory of Mīmāṃsā is the orthodox Brahmanic philosophy for which the word Veda constitutes the highest authority for all knowledge, as 'revelation.' Full conversation means 'mīmāṃsā.' Purva Mīmāṃsā is the "Preliminary Dialogue," namely the Veda's Karmakāṇḍa, and hence it is also known as Karmamīmāṃsā. The Purva Mīmāṃsā structure is very closely related to Indian Law as it is intended primarily to create injunctions that are different from those of civil law, mainly by dealing with sacrificial obligations instead of civil obligations.

Keywords: Vedānta Perception, Purva Mīmāṃsā, Indian Philosophy, word Veda constitutes, Indian method.

1. INTRODUCTION

The system of Mīmāṃsā is credited to Jaimini, a great sage who makes up Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. The Sabarāsvami, which is known as Sabarābhāṣya, is the most famous commentary on this sūtra. The latter Mīmāṃsā work¹ was based on this Sabarāsvami bhāṣya. Certain Mīmāṃsā commentators are Bhāṛṭṛmītra (referred to in Śloka-varttika verses 10 of Nyāyārātnakara), Hari, Upavarṣa (referred to in Sostrādīpikā), Havadāsa (Pratīyāsūtra 63), Bodhayāna, etc. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhakara Miśra are especially noteworthy among the commentators. Such two philosophers founded Mīmāṃsā's two leading branches, the schools of Bhaṭṭa and Prabhakara, which are very sister schools. In addition to the two Mīmāṃsā schools, another school known as the Miśramata started by a Murāri Miśra exists. It may be listed in this article. Nevertheless, this school is not known except in some other plays.

In three sections known as Śloka-varttika, Tantravarttika and Tūptika Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, historically considered as the leading contemporary in Śaṅkara, wrote his well-known independent exhibition of Sabarāsvami's bhāṣya. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Brhāttika is a significant novel. Mandana Miśra, the writer of Vidhiviveka, Bhavanaviveka, Vibhramaviveka, Brahmasiddhi, Sphoṭasiddhi and Mīmāṃsanurakmaṇi, was next great Mīmāṃsā scholar and follower of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. After Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's footprints, Parthasarathi Miśra wrote his Nyāyārātnamḍla,

Tantraratra and Sastradipika. The names of Sucarita Misra, the author of Tarkapada and Somesva Kasika, the author of the Nyayasudhd, are noteworthy among many other followers of Kumarila Bhatta. Umbeka has written a commentary on the Kasika entitled Tatparyatikd. Ramakrsna Bhaatta wrote a good commentary on the Yuktisnehapuransiddhantacandrikd Tarkapada of Sastredipika and on the remaining Sastradipika, Somanatha wrote his Mayukhamalikd. Some of the most important works from Mhams are Nyayamalavistara of Madhava, Subodhini, Sankara Bhatta's Mimamsdbalaprakdsa, Vacaspati Misra's Nyayakanikd, Krsnayaja, Krsnayajvan's Mimmsdparibhdsa, Anantadeva's MTamsandydyaprakdsa, Bhatacintamani, Nititattavirbhava's Cidananda Pandita, Mnameyodaya, Baskara's Laugaksi, Aartha's Graham. Pandit A. Cinnaswami Sastri, Ananta Shastri, Dr. Pashupatinath Shastri, Pt were among the later scholars writing on this system. Shastri S. Subrahmanja, Pt. Dr. G.P. Bhat, Mandan Misra and Dr. Vacaspati Upadhyayas, K.S. Ramasvami Shastri.

Possibly the pupil of Kumarila Bhatta Prabhakara Misra, has written two comments on the Sabarabhasya by Brhati and Laghvi. A first class academician and a polemical scholar, R Salikanatha Misra, wrote an independent Brhati treatise on the Prakaranapancika School of I Prabhakara. Rjuvimala Salikanatha Misra and Dipasikha both comments on Brhati and Laghvi of Prabhakara Misra. The authors are Bhavanatha Misra, the Nayaviveka Author, Nandlsvara, the Prabhakaravyaya Author, Ramanujaearya, and Tantrarahasy Author, and Varadaraya, the Dipika Author. The names of Dr. Gaganath Jha, M. Kuppuswami Shastri and Pt belong to the last scholars writing on this system. A. Subrahmanya Shastri is worth listing in particular.

The Mimamsa paradigm also acquires a sense of its epistemology like other systems of Indian philosophy. The origins of true knowledge according to Jaimini are of three different forms, namely interpretation (pratyaksa), inference (anumana) and verbal (sabda)². Between these three, Misra is Prabhakara, but Kumarila Bhatta and his followers add another pramasa called non-apprehension (anupalabdh) and contrast (upamana) as well as postulation (iarthapatti).

2. PERCEPTION ACCORDING TO JAIMINI:

The perception of Jaimini is that the cognition generated within the self by sense-organisms that have the right relationship with the real objects which perceive the current object. It is not because of the dharma or moral law that is always there³. This description is almost the same as the concept of Naiyayikas as Gautama and Annam Bhatta. The Jaimini description analyzes that perception necessitates I the actual object of perception, (ii) that the object comes into contact with, and (iii) the self, (purusa), which creates the cognition. The sensory organs and their objects must be connected in perception. And something else needs to be there. The sensory organs should be linked to the mind and the mind to the self. Through external vision, therefore, there must be sense-object contact, mental touch and inner-soul contact⁴. This description includes a dubious interpretation and misconception. Naiyayika argues. Although perception is said to be produced by a real object and removes hallucinations that aren't generated by external stimuli, perception and delusion that result from external stimuli do not rule out⁵. This criticism is prevented by Kumarila Bhatta, stating that Samprayoga means that sense organs are right to refer to their objects in order to prevent concerns about perception. Parthasarathi Misra points out that in the above n sutra Jaimini does not describe the interpretation. He only says that understanding is not the state of a supranational dharma. Thus the complaint of the Naiyayika is next to the label. This description cannot be advised to exclude a sensation of pleasure, pain and so forth, because it does not rely on external sensory bodies. It depends on pleasure, pain, etc., interaction with the inner organ or mind.

The commentators established Jaimini's epistemology. Sabarasvami, of course, is one of the oldest commentators who explains the Jaimini's sutra in Sabarabhasya's work and analyzes interpretation of that word. Sabarasvami believes that perception is the information created by the right relationship between sensory organs and actual objects. It is created from items that actually exist and that activate sensory organs. Sabarasvami argues that freedom from error is one of the fundamental criteria of immediate awareness in Jaimini's concept of perception. What is incorrect can be assumed to be not clear knowledge*. In fact, the distinction between correct apprehension and wrong apprehension is explained as follows. If the eye is obstructed by the mind, etc., the sense organ by darkness, etc., and the external object because of tininess and so on, then there is wrong apprehension, because correct apprehension is only when there are no obstructions. The fear is incorrect because there is a hindrance in perception. Here it can be asked how do you know? You know when a right cognition happens when the defects are removed. But then how to differentiate between the right and the incorrect. In the absence of proof (for the existence of a

defect), we assume that there is no defect because we do not see a defect in careful examination. And it is just that apprehension is right, and no other apprehension is wrong and is viewed as right.

Bhavadasa a previous Mmamsasutra commentator interprets Jaimini's perception sutra. There are two sections in Jaimini's perception sutra, according to Bhavadasa. The first part states that awareness is the information which occurs when someone has contact with objects with the sensory organs; and the second part states that they are not able to learn Dharma. The opinion of Bhavadasa cannot be a description of perception because a meaning does not fit in the sense, Kumarila Bhatta says. The author of the sutras explores the means of understanding dharma and thus there should be a concept of interpretation beside it. The concept of Bhavadasa, according to Kumarila Bhatta, is too broad, as it also refers to illusion and doubt. There is an eye contact with heated sand in the illusion mirage and a vague interpretation, e.g., 'is it a man or post.?' The eyes have something of a particular character in touch. The interpretation of Bhavadasa includes only dream cognitions and hallucinations in which the eyes are not objective. Only when it encompasses all cases of true perception and excludes all cases of incorrect perception could a description of perceiving be right as an invalid means of information. If this is articulated in a type "perception, the cognition occurs when a person's organs are in touch with the object which is cognized as grahya" the concept may have been right. Yet since the term grahya has not been added to the meaning, there remains the defect of over-extensivity, as the meaning says that even the awareness of an object through the interaction of the eyes with another entity will have the character of perception.

Mmamsasutra's Upavarsa Vrttikara correctly believed that the perceived sutra of Jaimini could not provide a proper meaning. Therefore Upavarsa changed the Jaimini sutra's reading¹⁴. In the case of the illusion and the problem occurring when a particular entity is in contact, Jaimini's sutra does not protect, according to Upavarsa. The meaning cannot take misconception and doubt, even without changing the reading. In the perception of silver in shell, the object in which actual touch is made is lost sight of as a result of some spectator, and the "silver" that is relieved by association is recalled. When, without altering the reading experience, the inference is that it is directly induced by sense-contact; otherwise, deference is often viewed as being often mediatedly triggered by sense-contact. For example, in the inference of fire, there is contact between the eyes and smoke that leads directly to the cognition of fire by reviving the memory of fire. Therefore illusion which does not result directly from sensual touch is removed from perception. Similarly, the mind mediates uncertainty and is thus removed. Parthasarathi Misra, on Vrttikara behalf, argued that even if it is acknowledged that 'silver' is remembered in shell-silver illusion, that 'silver' does not cease to be considered directly from the touch with the meaning because the reminiscent 'silver' is associated with the perceived 'this.' Once, although we accept that the shell-silver illusion results in a sensory contact over-extensivity in the cognition of yellow conch and double moon cannot be avoided, as both of this occur in direct interaction with the senses, but they are illusion instances. Thus the interpretation of Vrttikara is the correct one.

3. PERCEPTION ACCORDING TO BHATTAM TMARHSA:

The term perception is defined by Kumarila Bhatta, propounder of BhattamTmamsa. The right functioning of the sensory organs in relation to their objects, according to Kumarila Bhatta, is the perceived awareness. It is to be understood that the 4th sutra of the Jaimini Mimamsasutra is the basis of the conceptual theory of Kumarila Bhatta that the Mimamsa philosophy strongly endorses in its view of perception. The self gets in touch with the subconscious. The mental includes the sense-organ and the sense-organ touches the external entity. The difference between the two systems is the sensory organ of the MTmamsakas from space and the Naiyayikas from ether. Thus, Kumarila Bhatta tends to describe interfaces of perception. According to him, the prefix sam in the Mimamsasutra word samprayoga is correct and prevents any defective prayoga. By prayoga the work of sensory organs means Kumarila Bhatta in reference to their objects. In the case of silver cognition in the eye coat the function of the eye sensor is defective, and thus the prefix sam prevents this form of cognition. Therefore, the Mimamsasutra's fourth sutra can be called the concept of perception. Kumarila Bhatta's interpretation of the above sutra thus notes that the sutra describes perception as the cognition of one person produced by his sensory organs.

The ardent follower of BhattamTmamsa, Parthasarathi Misra, claims that awareness only can grasp sensitive objects, but it cannot grasp supersensible things such as dharma. Vrttikara's interpretation of insights was accepted by Parthasarathi Misra. He does not, however, agree with Jaimini's perception description. There is also another view on perception from Parthasarathi Misra. At first, Parthasarathi Misra says that a direct knowledge of form and so on leads to the assumption of a sense-organ, as direct knowledge often relies on the sense organ, for example, in the case of colour. Parthasarathi Misra agrees in this relation queuing or directness is the basic essence of perception,

and that its sensual basis is just a matter of deduction. Yet in terms of immediacy, he does not describe awareness. The second argument is that Parthasarathi Misra notes that the sensory organ, when an entity is in contact with it, produces awareness in the form of a specific and particular consciousness. But immediacy, differentiation and the particular character belong to interpretation ultimately. Accept that the immediate awareness that comes from sense touch and not from any other source, Parthasarathi Misra says, is perception and is generally referred to as such, regardless of how the philosopher describe perception. Parthasarathi Misra might have described the experience confidently as an accurate awareness specifically, clearly, and directly linked to sensory organ function. The above describes awareness as the true information that is centered on sense-contact.

4. PERCEPTION ACCORDING TO PRABHAKARAMLMSA:

A simple yet consistent concept of perception has provided Salikanatha Misra, the author of *Prakaranapancikd*. He says the experience is the immediate apprehension of the self and the apprehension (miti), which recognizes a caught entity (meya). The concept of each of these three is a constituent element in each act of perception. Three variables, i.e. meya, mata and miti, are disclosed according to the theory. According to the Prabhakaras, there are three factors: jnana or miti, jneya or meya, and mata, as mentioned in a phrase, like *ghatamahamjanami* i.e. "I know the jar." Such three are known as *triputi*, the theory of *triputi pratyak-savada* and this distinctive view of perception. Such three are known as *triputi*. Here, in the example above, *aham* is referring to *mata*, *ghata* is referring to *meya andjanami*. Such three variables are mutually known. But while *meya* is understood to be formless, the other two, i.e. *mata* and *miti* are understood to be formless. The *meya* is also known as *karma*. *Atma* is known as the /*carta* and the *miti* and the *kriya*. These three variables can be proven by direct apprehension. The first two, or a revealer, of those three variables, while the third is self-revealing. The *atma* and *meya* always depend on an anticipation of the case. They are not auto-light, because they do not manifest in consciousness, while they occur during sleep. Apprehension is a manifester of its own. It is formless and by its very definition exposes the *atma* and the *meya*. it shows itself. Apprehension illuminates the subjects and artifacts as the lamp's light and artifacts always reflect light. All these considerations are very obvious to Salikanatha Misra. Much as a second light is not required in order to show a light, a second fear is not needed to display fear. Salikanatha Misra also retains the understanding of qualities of substances and of universals in relation to objects due to the interaction between sensory organs and them. So far as the self is concerned, all kinds of information as cognitions are viewed by it. According to Prabhakara Misra, consciousness is self-lit; both the ego and the non-self, the knowledgeable subject and the knowledgeable object are manifested. It is the peculiarity of the doctrine of perception of Prabhakara Misra that differs from the doctrine of perception of Bhattas.

5. BHATTANILMMSAKA'S CRITICISM ON PRABHAKARA'S THEORY OF TRIPLE PERCEPTION:

The Prabhakara Misra theory of interpretation criticises Parthasarathi Misra. He maintains that '*Ayam ghatah*,' that is, 'this is a box' and '*Ghatamahamjanami*,' that is, 'I know the jar.' In the past, only the *ghata* object is represented, not the self or the fear. The latter recalls the item *ghata*, which is the prime concern for the pot. The former is therefore a case of interpretation, while the latter is a case of inference and the two never go hand in hand. Therefore, according to Parthasarathi Misra, the Prabhakaras confuse both unnecessarily when they say that every knowledge includes a triple consciousness. The Prabhakaras hold that the relationship between causal factors generating cognition is auto-luminous in nature and that it enables us to apprise not only the cognition itself, but also its validity. According to Prabhakara, *samvit*, which we are aware of explicitly, is not a subjective process, but the product of a subjective process and is called *jnana*, which results in an object's consciousness and which is implied instead of clearly understood.

Sucarita Misra, author of the *Kasika* commentary, criticizes the self-esteem of Prabhakara Misra. According to Sucarita Misra, *jnana* is consciousness, but the combination of the soul and the mind does not consist of a consciousness, thus, the mind is aware, as distinct as the soul is, of the connection, whereas Prabhakara Misra is not ready for a view such as that of extraordinary nature. *Jnana* or *buddhi*, therefore, can only be the *samvit* which is kept self-conscious by Prabhakara Misra and thus a distortion of the view of Sabarasvami which it pretends to be promoting in its *Brhafi*. In addition, since Prabhakara Misra maintains that in every experience, even though the form that is represented is only one, at the same time, the self, object and cognition are understood as one, there can be no awareness of their reciprocal differences, which means that three are different from one another and contribute only to Buddhist subjectivism. Prabhakara Misra may suggest that concurrent anxiety is often not inherently an

identification. Color and light are similarly apprehended, but not the same. However, the Prabhakara Misra theory doesn't help.

6. JAYANTA BHATTA'S CRITICISM ON MLMAMSA THEORY OF PERCEPTION:

The old Naiyayika Jayanta Bhatta criticizes in her own way Bhavadasa, Upavarsa, Kumarila Bhatta and Sabarasvami. Jayanta Bhatta presents the Mlmamsa perception theory with the simple observation that if the followers of Jaimini contend that the Jaimini perception sutra is merely a guide of dharma and has no direct effect on the definition of perception, the aphorism of describing the perception is uselessly debated. At the other hand, if they find the concept of perception to be expressed, they are clearly mistake, because the deficiency of being too large is not avoided by it, as it refers to cases of doubt and delusion as the sensual object touch (satsamprayoga) is also based upon. Jayanta Bhatta is aware that even Jaimini's own school's commentators differ and are far-fetched by diverging definitions, especially by analytical division into their elements of this sampling compound, as I satdrifi samprayoge (ii) sati samprayoge (sati, sam samyak prayoge) (ii) and (ii) sati samprayoge (sati) The followers of Jaimini object to this move by Jayanta Bhatta and oppose all interpretations on the following grounds:

(i) If the term is understood as "the interaction of the sense organ with the actual actual entity," only those hallucinations which are not conditioned by actual current objects, but which are conditioned by the real objects, shall be excluded from the realm of perception;

(ii) Jayanta Bhatta cites Slokavarttika in denying this second alternative interpretation, in which Kumarila Bhatta declares that the word 'sat' is a participle, "the indeclinable terms sam mean propemic," the compound sampling is represented by participle sat and the correct meaning of aphorism means, "when the contact is made" "the second alternative interpretation is that However, the claim of Jayanta Bhatta is refuted because the prophet of communication between the senses is supersensitive. If the result is found to imply the 'propessimism,' then it is not viable because the result, i.e. fear, is not explicitly eligible as the 'proper' adjective. Again, Jayanta Bhatta says the Mbnamsakas shouldn't have unnecessary pain if it is maintained that the adjectiv is supplied by the people themselves, as in this way they very much believe that it is a completed reality.

(iii) As regards a third possible interpretation of the expression, Jayanta Bhatta refers to Mr Vrttikar who considers the original reading of the aphorism to be defective and thus allows reciprocal modification of the terms sat and tat in the sutra to provide a proper meaning of perceived perception. However, Jayanta Bhatta thinks that this interpretation of the sutra is not enough, because this concept also refers to doubt. If the MTmamsakas find that the doubt applies to two distinct objects but the sensory organ does not touch either of them, Jayanta Bhatta says that, in such a case, the objects are referred alternative to the sensory organ and that the concept is therefore also applicable.

7. PERCEPTION AND SANNIKARSA:

Like other Indian systems, Munamsa also maintains that perception depends on sensory organ intercourse with their objects. Just two ways of communication with what is joint (Samjukta tdddtmya) are accepted in the Bhattamimasaka. The various substances are perceived in combination with sensory organs. The Bhattas refuse the touch with samctvdya, since the sound that this interaction sounds are not perceived as a commodity, but as an everlasting content, is therefore apprehended along with the auditory organ as other materials. Again, if samavaya is refused as a means of communication, communication is also denied with the samavetasamavaya. Visesanata is rejected because the Bhattas are not perceptibles, but are classified as anupalabdhi by a particular means of knowledge. The first is decided upon, but with a different name, samyukta-tadatmya, where tadathmya is substituted for samavaya, out of the other two modes of touch viz., samyuktasamavaya and samyukta-samaveta-saavdy. Via samyukta-tadatmya touch, attributes, behavior and universals of substances are therefore interpreted 39. Gaga Bhatta a Bhattamlmamsa follower argues that the sensory organs and their subjects have three kinds of relationship, namely I union (samyoga), (ii). single inherent in the Samiukta samavaya (samyukta-samaveta-samavdy), and (iii) inherent in a single inheritance. In accordance with the sensory organs, stimuli are perceived. Unified inherence (samyukta-samavaya) is the consistency, the behavior and the generalities inherent in the substances. Group qualities and acts inherent in the harmony (samyukta-samaveta-samavdy) are known. But the intrinsic intrinsic recognition is not acknowledged by Gaga Bhatta. According to Gaga Bhatta, the sound is not viewed as being intrinsic (samavaya) in the Nyaya-Waisesika because the sound is not a quality, but a material. And thus the sound's generic essence is not perceived by inherent inherent substance either; it is perceived as the generic character of some other substance by means of unified inherence, for example "ajar." There are thus only three kinds of connections between the sensory

bodies and their objects according to the Bhattamlmamsaka⁴⁰. RS Misra says that there are two forms of meaning-object, viz., union (samyoga), unified (samyukta samavaya), inherent (samavaya) and sense-inherent (samavaya).

8. VEDANTA THEORY OF PERCEPTION:

Badarayana has developed the Vedanta method. The word 'Vedanta' literally means 'the end of the Vedas,' stands mainly for the Upanisads, both chronologically and philosophically, considered as the end of the Vedas. The upanisads are chronologically called the 'end of the veda,' as each of the 4 vedas consists of four forms of literature, i.e. the Samhitas, the brahmanas, the aranyakas and the Upanisad. The Upanisads are also regarded philosophically as the 'end of the vedas' which mark the conclusion of the Speculation of the Vedic and contain the nature of the enlightenment of the Vedic 63. The word 'Vedanta' has subsequently been extended to include the Bhagavadgita, the Brahmasutra and their remarks, etc., which are all based on the Upanisads. Vedanta⁵ is described as Upanisadpramana⁶⁴ in Vedantsara Sadananda Yogindra. The Vedanta system, therefore, is the philosophy that leads from the Upanisads. Max Muller finds it to be India's native ideology. The Upanisad Philosophy, which is generally known as the Vedanta, refers to the starting point of Indian philosophy, acknowledging the Vedas as supreme authority. The Upanisad is in touch with vedantavijnanam and talks of Vedanta's greatest mystery.

The Vedanta philosophy focuses on the relationship between God and the earth and the human universe with its celestial nature. The philosophy of Vedanta is primarily an interpretation of the Brahmasutra and is called Vedantasutra. Vedantism has two main distinctions in wider terms: monistic and monotheistic. In other words, Vedantism. The non-dualistic monistic or i.e. Compared to this philosophy, Jiva and Brahma are absolutely similar. Advaita school was founded by Sankara In the Advaita School of Vedanta, Vivarana and Vacaspati School are included. The monotheistic school of Vedanta comprises Ramanuja, Vallabha, Nimbarka, Sri Caitanya and Madhva. The Visistadvaita, Suddhadvaita, Dvaitadvaita, Acintyabhedabheda, and Dvaita are also known as the five single-theistic systems. Sankara's commentary on Brahmasutra was based on the school of Advaita Vedanta. The Mandukyakarika of Gaudapada is the earliest available treatise of the Advaita school. Sankara's Brahmasutra commentary is the source of a host of comments and studies on Vedantism with an immense originality, vigor and philosophical perspective. Anandagiri, Sankara disciple, has written a commentary entitled Nydyanirnaya on Brahmasutra. Again, Sankara's teacher, Govindananda, wrote a commentary on Ratnaprabha, a Brahmasutra. A commentary on Brahmasutra called Bhamati has been rendered by Vacaspati Misra, who established the Vacaspati school. Amalananda wrote a commentary on this Bhamati called Kalpataru. Appayadksita in his Kalpataruparimala commented again on this work. Sankara's other follower, such as Padmapada, also named Sadananda, wrote about Pancapadika. Prakasatman, identified as Pancapadikavivarana, wrote a commentary on Brahmasutra. The Naiskarmyasiddhi of Suresvara is another work of Advaita Vedanta. Vidyaranya again wrote an excellent book called Vivaranaprimeyasamgraha, which dealt with Pancapadikavivarana's ideas. He is a good treatise for his Jivanmuktiviveka on the Vedanta philosophy of liberation. A famous and illustrative treatise of Advaita Vedanta in verse is Vidyaranya's Pancadasi. Samksepariraka, written by Sarvajnatamuni, is another significant work written in verse on the key lessons from Sankara's Bhasya. Ramatirtha also reflected on this. The Khandanakhandakhadya of Srlharsa is the most popular work on dialectics in the Vedanta. Citesukha also writes an independent dialectic work called TattvadJpika, which possibly thrived shortly after SrTharesa. The Khandanakhandakhady also received comments from Sankara Misra and Raghunatha. Dharmarajadhvarindra has written a dissertation on Vedanta epistemology and the central subject of Vedanta of great originality and merit. Ramakrsnadhvarindra's Sikhamani and Amaradas ' Maniprabha are other views on Vedantaparibhasa. The Advaitasiddhi Madhusudana SarasvatT is another detailed Advaita Vedanta treatise. Certain outstanding works of the philosophical Advaita Vedanta are Sadananda Vyasa of the Vedantasara, Prakasananda of the Vedantashantamuktavali, Sadananda of Yati of the Advaabrahamasiddhi, etc. Sankara's monism or absolutism was criticized by Ramanuja. And the ontological nature of God, the human souls and the universe was created and God's soul and universe were known as God's qualities or modes. Sr Tbhasya on Brahmasutra, written by Ramanuja is the main exhibition at Visistadvaita college. GTtabhasya, Vedantasara, Vedartha Sangraha and Vedanta DTpa, composed of Ramanuja are also important tracts of this school. The famous Venkatanatha, in his work Tattvatfka is also the subject of Ramanuja's bhasya. A significant treatise of the Visistadvaita School is Nyayaparisuddhi's Venkatanatha. SrTbhasya had a commentary by Meghanadari, a contemporary of Venkatanatha, entitled Nyayaprakasika. Two plays were written, Prameyasamgraha and Samgatimala, by Visnucitta, contemporary juniors of Ramanuja. Varadavisnu Misra Mdnaydthdmyanirnaya, Varada Narayana Bhattaraka's Tattvaratnakara, Snhivasadasa's Yatindramatadipika on Sribhasya etc are other important works of Visistadvaita School. Vallabha wrote the Suddhadvaita School. Brahmasutra's Anubhasya is the most systematic treatise of Suddhadvaita School. Anubhasya, called Prakdsa, was

subcomed by Purasottama, a follower of Yallabha school. The Southdhadvaitamartanda of Giridhara and the Prasthdnaratnakara of Puraottama, are important textbooks for Vedanta Southdhadvaita School. The two detailed treaties of the Vallabha School are Vallabha's Anubhasya on the Brahmasutra and Prakasa's Tattvarthadipika. The theory of dualist monism, that is, dvaitadvaitavada, was defended at the Nimbarka School. Nimbarka focuses on disparity between Brahman and the individual souls and the universe as well as on the nondifference or personality (Bhedabheda). The relationship of identification between them was promoted by Nimbarka. Vedantaparijatasaurabha in the Brahmasutra of Nimbarka is the main exhibition at Nimbarka College. The DasasloJa, Guruparampara, Vedntatattvabodha etc. are another notable works of Nimborka School.

Davita Vedanta's author is Madhva. He understands that God and the human soul and matter are different from each other, that one soul and another soul are immortal. One earthly thing and the other. This is Madhva's main lesson in dualism. At the Madhvan School Madhva has made ten treaties of its own in particular: Brahmasutrabhasya, Tattvaviveka, Tattvodyota, Visnutattvavinirnyayas, Karmanirnyayas, Prapanca and Pramasalaksana, Prapanca and Mithyatvanumana Khandana, UPadhikhandana. Madhva's Brahma's, Brahma's and Brahma's are also important Davita school treatises. They are also significant. The Vedanta takes interpretation as an essential source of scientific understanding, like other systems of indigenous philosophy. Three information sources: e.g. interpretation, inference and testimony in the novel, are identified by Sankara66. Later writers add compare, postulate and not knowing. Ramanuja only has 3: understanding, inference and testimony in the scriptures. Ramanuja agrees with Madhva 7fi and Nimbarka. Within Vallabha's method, no certain number of information sources are recognized but scriptural testimony has put great emphasis. Acintyabheda also trust in the three ways that it did not learn—interpret, deduce and testify.

9. CONCLUSION

Advaita Vedānta's ontology is based on the premise that the supreme truth (Brahman) is no distinction from the manifest universe. It is defined as undifferentiated being, a pure, unskilled consciousness (or qualityless existence). Therefore, the true truth (brahman), which includes the human being, does not differ from the self (ātman). The Self (ātman) implants the body-mind complex from a psychological perspective as "awareness-as-awareness," which according to Rao is basically unintentional. It has no content and therefore is not a cognitive entity. It is nonrelative and yet fundamental to all information and understanding. The realization in the human being of the unqualified consciousness (brahman) can be represented as sat-cit-ānanda or pure life, pure consciousness, and pure happiness. This perception of non-difference between the Self (ātman) and the unqualified (Brahman) consciousness is typically not felt as a consequence of primeval illusion (māyā) in human life. The theory of the Māyā describes the misinterpretation of the cognitive qualities of the experience experienced in the complex of the body-mind and its restricted adjacents (upādhis). The primary illusion (māyā) is reflected in human experience, through the projecting force (vik paga śakti) and a veiling force (āva tis kākṛti) of human cognitive apparats, in the words ṣa tuber (ca. 700 C.E., historically 788 to 820 C.E.), one of Advaita's most influential thinkers. The first feature creates a subjective perception of the natural world, and the second feature portrays the material manifestations that the subjective being encounters as something other than what they really are. Advaita Vedānta establishes his epistemology on five valid knowledge methods (pramā tilas), namely perception (pratyak tilasa), inference (anumāna), a comparability (upamāna), presumption (arthāpatti) and testimonies valid (śabda), which serve as the soteriological instruments in the process of the elimination of ignorance (avidyā). According to Advaita Vedānta, ignorance (avidyā), which retains the expert perception of distinction (bheda) between the qualityless consciousness (brahman) and the human Self (ātman), is the root cause of human suffering. Therefore the direction of information (jñā mārga), as it seems soteriological, may be used to overcome the existential conflict that is at the center of a relationship between entity and entity, which is normally formed in the daily human existence of the world and oneself.

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